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PUZZLE OF BIAS CRIME STATUTES

Bias crimes-or, as they are sometimes called, "hate crimes" 1are crimes committed because of the race, color, or religion of the
victim. A house of worship is defaced, not as a random act of hooliganism, but because it is a place where Jews worship. A man is
mugged, not because he appears wealthy or weak, but because he is
Black. These are examples of bias crimes. Bias crime statutes increase the penalties for such crimes.
Recently a wave of bias crime statutes has swept across our country.2 This wave may seem unsurprising. Our legal culture is permeated by the ideal of equality. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment enshrines equality as a central value in our
Constitution. Civil rights laws prohibit private discrimination in a
wide variety of contexts, such as employment, housing, and public education.3 Because bias crimes are acts committed based on factors
such as race, color, or religion, bias crimes are arguably instances of
discrimination. Moreover, because bias crimes are crimes, they seem
the most extreme, hence most objectionable, instances of discrimina1 "Bias crimes" is a more accurate term than "hate crimes." The statutes under consideration likely apply to many criminal acts in which hate, understood as a particular subjective emotion, is not involved. For example, a White youth who attacks a Black in order to gain the
admiration of the youth's racist peers will be liable under these statutes even if he personally
does not hate Blacks. See text accompanying infra notes 149-52. Likewise, the statutes under
consideration do not apply to many criminal acts based on hate. For example, an employee who
assaults his overbearing supervisor will not be liable under these statutes even if the assault was
motivated by hate for the supervisor.
2 The majority of states have enacted bias crime statutes. See infra notes 10-17. Furthermore, in 1994, Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate
guidelines for enhancing penalties for bias crimes. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096. Such guidelines were
promulgated and are now effective. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELI

S MANUAL § 3A1.1(a)

(1995) (reproduced infra note 16). Additionally, some localities have taken measures in response to bias crimes. See James B. Jacobs, Rethinking the War Against Hate Crimes: A New
York City Perspective,11 CIm. JUsT. ETmcs 55,55 (1992) (describing New York City Police unit
for monitoring and investigating bias crimes).
3 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a) (voting), 2000a(a) (public accommodations), 2000c-(a)(2)
(public education), 2000d (federally funded programs), 2000e-2(a) (employment practices), 3605
(real-estate transactions), 6102 (age discrimination in federally funded programs) (1994).
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tion. Bias crimes thus appear to offend the principle of equality that
some have taken as underlying liberal political theory.4 The criminal
law appropriately applies its sanctions to conduct that violates society's most fundamental principles. From this perspective, bias crime
statutes seem appealing.
Viewed from another liberal perspective, however, bias crime
statutes seem puzzling. Liberalism is associated with the ideal of freedom of thoughts By implication, liberalism rejects the possibility of
"thought crimes." Biased thought is surely repugnant. Yet thoughts
themselves, we believe, even repugnant ones, usually should not be
the basis of criminal sanctions. Of course, bias crime statutes do not
punish pure thoughts; they punish biased thoughts only where those
thoughts underlie a criminal act. The law in the absence of bias crime
statutes, however, already punished the criminal act to the extent considered appropriate. The additional penalty imposed by bias crime
statutes thus is directly a function of the additional biased thought.
How can thought itself make the crime worse andjustify greaterpunishment? This question exposes a core tension in liberalism between the
ideals of equality of treatment and freedom of thought.
Traditional criminal law doctrine appears to offer an easy answer
to this question. Mens rea is a securely established doctrine of the
criminal law. Under mens rea, mental states are relevant to fixing
punishment levels. Specifically, prohibited acts committed intentionally are punished more harshly than those committed merely knowingly, those committed knowingly more harshly than those committed
merely recklessly, and so on. Whether an act is done intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly depends on the thoughts that underlie the
act. The doctrine of mens rea appears to offer an unproblematic example of the relevance of thought to punishment. Indeed, more than
being unproblematic, the doctrine of mens rea seems to show a necessary moral connection between thought and punishment.
Analogizing to mens rea, however, does not solve, but deepens,
the puzzle of bias crime statutes. "Intentionally," "knowingly," and
"recklessly" are broad, highly general categories for characterizing action on the basis of underlying mental states. Intentional acts, for example, may be based on a wide variety of values or ends. Likewise, if
merely told that an individual acted recklessly, one would not know
anything about the specific content of the individual's beliefs or values. In contrast, the mental element required for bias crimes is defined in terms of beliefs or values concerning such specific matters as
race, color, and religion. Because of its content specificity, the mental
4 See RONALD DwoRmN, A MATTER OF PRINcIPLE ch. 9 (1985) ("Why Liberals Should
Care About Equality").
5 See, ag., Jo-N STUART MiLL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprintedin ON LERTY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 5 (1991); JoHN RAWLS, POLICAL LMERALISM 289-371 (1993).
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element required for bias crimes appears different in kind from those
traditionally relevant.6 Thus, the puzzle of bias crimes is this: the
overt act is already punished; the underlying thought, to the extent
biased, appears irrelevant to punishment.
Thus far, scholarly interest in bias crime statutes has focused
largely on their constitutionality. In particular, the consistency of bias
crime statutes and the First Amendment has been debated.7 Yet,
wisely, neither the First Amendment nor the other provisions of the
Constitution were intended to permit only the wisest laws to be enacted. Many possible laws resting on mistaken moral or factual foundations would be constitutional. Today, the constitutionality of bias
crime statutes is largely settled.8 Questions concerning their ultimate
wisdom and significance for liberalism, however, remain open. In particular, justifications of bias crime statutes in light of the tensions
within liberalism and the puzzle presented above have received insufficient attention.
This Article has two goals. The first is to critically examine the
theoretical foundations of bias crime statutes in order to understand
and assess the lines along which they may be best justified. My primary focus shall be on the philosophical or moral issues that are
raised by various potential justifications of bias crime statutes. To the
extent relevant, I shall also consider some more practical issues of enforcement and deterrence. A clearer understanding of what bases exist for bias crime statutes, and what bases are illusory, will place our
6 The distinction between mental states traditionally relevant to the criminal law and those
relevant under bias crime statutes may be analogized to a distinction in First Amendment doctrine. A statute prohibiting "racial statements" (Le., statements concerning racial matters)
would clearly constitute a content regulation. A statute prohibiting "reckless statements" (.e,
statements made with little aforethought) likely would not because a reckless statement could be
made about anything. Bias crime statutes apply to racist, as opposed to reckless, action. In this
manner, they appear as different in kind from traditional criminal statutes as content regulations
differ from noncontent regulations.
7 The seminal work belongs to Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But
Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutionaland Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation
Laws, 39 UCLA L. REv. 333 (1991). See also David Goldberger, Hate Crime Laws and Their
Impact on the First Amendment, 1992/1993 ANN. Surv. AM. L. 569; Frederick M. Lawrence,
Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox:Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist
Speech, 68 No=R DAME L. REv. 673 (1993); George G. Size & Glenn R. Britton, Is There Hate
Speech?: R.A.V. and Mitchell in the Context of FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,21 Omo N.U. L.
REv.913 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive Private and Public: Some Notes
Inspired by the Problems of Hate and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 Sup.CT.Rnv. 1; Eric J. Grannis,
Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionalityof Penalty Enhancementfor
Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 178 (1993); Lisa S.L. Ho, Comment, Substantive Penal Hate
Crime Legislation:Toward Defining ConstitutionalGuidelines Following the R.A.V. v. City of St
Paul and Wisconsin v. Mitchell Decisions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 711 (1994).

8 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (upholding facial challenge to Wisconsin
bias crime statute). Because Mitchell was brought as a facial challenge, "as applied" challenges
remain possible, as do challenges based on state constitutions.
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society's battle against the evils of bias on a surer, albeit narrower,
footing. The second goal of the Article is to address some fundamental questions of criminal law. Besides providing a vehicle for combating a singularly disturbing phenomenon in our society, bias crime
statutes provide a vehicle for examining such issues as the relevance to
punishment of motives, motivations, and desires; the limits of the interests protectable through criminal law; and the relation between the
terms of criminal statutes and the evils they are intended to address.
The inquiry into bias crime statutes also illuminates the grounds for
other laws in which bias is an element, such as employment discrimination and other civil rights laws.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly surveys the content and structure of bias crime statutes. Having identified the distinguishing features of bias crime statutes, Part II elaborates a
framework for analyzing these statutes. In Part II, I argue that the
penalties imposed by a criminal justice system, at a minimum, must be
deserved by those they are inflicted on and that desert, in turn, is a
function of (1) the gravity of the wrongdoing involved and (2) the
wrongdoer's degree of culpability for that wrongdoing. Thus, all justifications for the increased penalties imposed by bias crime statutes
can be analyzed as taking bias to be relevant to either gravity of
wrongdoing or degree of culpability, two independent moral
categories.
Part Ill examines possible justifications for bias crime statutes.
Subpart III.A takes a first pass at bias crime statutes, construing them
on the model of traditional criminal offenses. So construed, the bias
element of the statutes appears unrelated to either wrongdoing or culpability, and thus unable to justify the increased penalties established
by the statutes. Therefore, the examination of more novel theories is
warranted.
In subpart Il.B, alternative wrongdoing-based theories of bias
crime statutes are considered. These theories cast a wider net to isolate the distinctive wrongdoing involved in bias crimes that justifies
their greater punishment. Under such wrongdoing-based theories, a
perpetrator's biased reason for acting may be considered a wrongful
feature of the act itself or a proxy for some wrongful consequence of
the act. I argue that considerations of autonomy and personhood preclude recognizing an interest in another's reasons for acting of the sort
that might produce a wrongdoing above and beyond that of the underlying crime. I then examine the position that bias is a useful proxy for
further wrongful consequences that often accompany bias crimes, such
as psychological harm to the victim or fear and insecurity in the victim's community. This position I judge to present a potentially sound
strategy for defending bias crime statutes. Nevertheless, I argue that
there is no good rationale for the criminal law to employ bias as a
1019

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
proxy of this type when the wrongful consequences could be better
addressed through statutes which do not employ bias as a proxy.
Subpart III.C considers alternative culpability-based justifications
of bias crime statutes. These theories would justify the enhanced penalties established by bias crime statutes on the ground that those who
commit bias crimes are, in some sense, more culpable for the crime
than those who commit crimes that are similar, but lack the bias element triggering bias crime statutes. I argue that bias, whether considered as an intention, motivation, or desire, cannot play the culpabilityincreasing role required to justify bias crime statutes. Although racism and other forms of bias are morally flawed views of persons, they
fail to connect the bias criminal to his wrongdoing more than other
bases for crime. On the basis of these inquiries into wrongdoing and
culpability, I conclude that the theoretical foundations for bias crime
statutes, though not indefensible, are shaky.
I.

AN OvERvIEw OF BIAS CRIME STATUTES

Bias crime statutes are almost as varied in their scope, linguistic
particulars, and circumstances of creation as the jurisdictions that
have enacted them. There is no single formal or historical feature that
a law must have in order to be properly called a bias crime statute.
Nevertheless, some common characteristics allow bias crime statutes
to be recognized as such and permit them to be discussed in general
terms. One manner of describing bias crime statutes is as a family of
statutes sharing a common ancestor. In 1981, the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith released a model statute establishing the offense of "Intimidation." This model statute provided:
Intimidation
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual
orperceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientationof

anotherindividual or group of individuals, he violates Section __ of the
Penal Code (insert code provision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, assault, and/or other statutorily proscribed
criminal conduct).
B. Intimidation is a __ misdemeanor/felony (the degree of the criminal
liability should be at least one degree more serious than that imposed for
commission of the offense). 9

The critical features of this model statute are that (1) it includes an
element concerning an actor's reason for committing a previously defined offense, and (2) it imposes a penalty that is an enhancement of
the penalty for the previously defined offense.
9 STEvrtN M. FREEMAN, HATE CRIEs STATUrTEs: A 1991 STATUS REPORT 4 (1991) (emphasis added).

1020

91:1015 (1997)

Foundationsof Bias Crime Statutes

On the basis of this model, many jurisdictions have enacted similarly worded statutes. Regarding the critical phrase of the model statute-"by reason of the actual or perceived race [etc.]"-different
jurisdictions have used different locutions. The most common is the
commission of a specified offense "because of race, [etc.]" 10 Some

jurisdictions have included a requirement of "maliciousness,""1 but it

10 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-121(2) (Supp. 1995) (providing that "[a] person commits
ethnic intimidation if, with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that
person's race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin," that person causes or places another
in fear of personal injury or damage to property); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 729A.2 (West 1993) (defining a bias crime as a crime "committed against a person or a person's property because of the
person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability"); MD.CODE ANN.Cum. LAW § 470A (Supp. 1993) (providing that no
person may "[h]arass or commit a crime upon a person or damage the ... property of... [a]
person because of that person's race, color, religious beliefs, or national origin"); MNN. STAT.
ANN.§ 6092231(4) (West Supp. 1996) (criminalizing an assault committed "because of the victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability ...
age, or national origin"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 574.090(1) (Supp. 1993) (providing that "[a] person
commits the crime of ethnic intimidation in the first degree if, by reason of any motive relating
to the race, color, religion, or national origin of another individual or group of individuals," that
person damages another's property above a set value or engages in certain unlawful uses of
weapons); MONT.CODE ANN.§ 45-5-221(1) (1993) (providing that "[a] person commits the offense of malicious intimidation or harassment when, because of another person's race, creed,
religion, color, national origin, or involvement in civil rights or human rights activities, he purposely or knowingly, with the intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend[,]"
causes bodily injury or damage to property); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (McKinney 1989) (enhancing the penalty for aggravated harassments committed "with intent to harass, annoy,
threaten or alarm another person, because of the race, color, religion or national origin of such
person"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14(a) (1993) (providing that a person commits ethnic intimidation if "because of race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin, [the offender] assault[s] another person, or damage[s] or deface[s] the property of another person or threaten[s]
to do any such act"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3(c) (1993) (enhancing the penalty for misdemeanors
"committed because of the victim's race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin"); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04(1-2) (1985) (providing that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he
"[i]njures, intimidates, or interferes with another because of his sex, race, color, religion, or national origin in order to intimidate"); O. Rnv. STAT. § 166.155 (1995) (providing that a person
commits "the crime of intimidation in the second degree" if he intentionally injures, damages the
property of, or intimidates another person "because of that person's perception of the other's
race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation"); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (1992) (providing that a person will be guilty of a felony if he does or attempts to threaten, injure, or
intimidate another person "because of such other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation or sex"). The above citation was based on a survey of bias crime
statutes compiled by Professor Frederick M. Lawrence. Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MicH. L. Rnv. 320,33738 n.74 (1994).
11 See IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987) (providing that a person commits "malicious harassment" when causing injury or property damage "maliciously and with the specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race, color, religion, ancestry, or
national origin"); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN.§ 750.147b (West 1991) (providing that a person
commits "ethnic intimidation" if that person causes injury or property damage "maliciously, and
with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin"); OKLA.STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (1991) (providing that a person
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is unclear whether this requirement adds a substantive element. Simply committing most of the offenses that are predicates for bias crimes
appears malicious. Furthermore,12some jurisdictions have referred to
"motivations" of different types. Other jurisdictions have required
that the crime be committed with "ill-will, hatred or bias. 1 3 The most
well-known statute in this family, reviewed and upheld by the
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,14 enhanced the penalty for
specified crimes in which the actor "[i]ntentionally select[ed] the person against whom the crime... is committed... in whole or in part
because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race [etc.] of
that person."'5 A recently enacted federal statute employs similar
language.16 Still others have adhered to the model statute's "by reason of" formulation. 17 These subtly different formulations have the
commits "malicious intimidation or harassment because of race," if he "maliciously and with the
specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race [a]ssault[s] or
batter[s] another person . .. [or] [d]amage[s] . . . any property of another person or ...
[t]hreaten[s], by word or act, to do any [of the above] acts"); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws § 22-19B-1
(Michie Supp. 1996) (criminalizing "[a]ctions constituting harassment" where a person "maliciously and with the specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin... [c]ause[s] physical injury to another
person... [or] [d]eface[s] any real or personal property of another person... [or] [d]amage[s]
... any ...property of another person or... [t]hreaten[s] by word or act, to do the acts
prohibited"); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.080 (1996) (providing that "[a] person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts
because of his or her perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin...
[or] handicap ...[and] [c]auses physical injury to ... another person ...[or] [t]hreatens a
specific person.., and places that person ...in reasonable fear of harm"). The above citation
was based on a survey of bias crime statutes compiled by Professor Frederick M. Lawrence,
supra note 10, at 337 n.74.
12 See MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 28.257a (West 1994) (requiring the reporting of crimes
"motivated by prejudice or bias based upon race, ethnic origin, religion, gender or sexual orientation"); VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-42.1 (Michie 1992) (providing that an action for injunctive relief
or civil damages, or both, shall lie against any person who intimidates, harasses, or injures another person, or vandalizes his real or personal property, "where such acts are motivated by
racial, religious or ethnic, animosity").
13 NJ. STAT. AaN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995).
14 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
15 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1996).
16 See U.S. SENTENCING GuiDETNEs MAAL § 3AL.1(a) (1995). Section 3A1.L(a)

provides:
If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court at
sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionallyselected
any victim or any property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any
person, increase by 3 levels.
(Id.) (emphasis added).
17 See 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that a person commits a
hate crime when, "by reason of the actual or perceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry,

gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, or national origin of another individual," that person commits certain specified crimes); Mo. REv. STAT. § 574.090(1) (Supp. 1993)
(providing that a person commits "the crime of ethnic intimidation in the first degree if, by
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potential for spawning different interpretations and applications.18
Nevertheless, courts have not yet distinguished among them. Because
I desire to speak generally about bias crime statutes, I shall focus on
the most common formulation that, without more, prohibits acts undertaken "because of' race, etc. To the extent these terms are open to
interpretation, I shall address alternative interpretations where
relevant.
In addition to varying the language used to express the nature of
the "because of" requirement, the statutes also vary the characteristics
to which the requirement applies. While race, color, religion, and national ancestry are almost universally included, some statutes also inelude sex, disability, age, and sexual orientation.1 9 Similarly, statutes
vary in the scope of the underlying acts or crimes that will, in the
proper circumstances, give rise to the enhanced penalty. Broader statutes apply to all crimes, while narrower ones apply to, for example,
only acts that cause or place another in fear of personal injury or
property damage.2 0 Because of the range of formulations, I will occasionally speak generally about "specified characteristics" and "specified underlying acts."
Finally, the penalty enhancement mechanism of different bias
crime statutes may vary. These differences, however, are largely formal. Sometimes bias crime statutes simply upwardly shift the sentenc-

ing range for the underlying offense. 21 Sometimes bias crime statutes
create new offenses, the penalty for which may run consecutively with
those for the underlying offense.22 Either way, the substantive effect
is to increase penalties imposed or penalties to which defendants are
exposed. Such increases may be substantial.2
reason of any motive relating to the race, color, religion, or national origin of another individual
or group of individuals," that person damages another's property above a set value or engages in
certain unlawful uses of weapons); NEv. REv. STAT. § 207.185 (Supp. 1995) (providing that an
aggravating factor of a misdemeanor is that the offense was committed "by reason of the actual
or perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another person or
group of persons"); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1993) (providing that a person
commits ethnic intimidation if he commits a parallel crime "by reason of the race, color, religion,
or national origin of another person or group of persons").
18 See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
19 See, eg., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp. 1996).
20 Compare U.S. SmErmTciNo GumELnEs MANUAL § 3A1.1a(a) (1995) (not limiting scope
of underlying offense), with CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-121(2) (Supp. 1995) (limiting underlying
act to placing in fear of injury or property damage).
21 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3(c) (1993); Omo
Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1996).
22 See, eg., 720 ILL. CohN. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West Supp. 1996); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 574.090(1)(2) (Supp. 1993); On. REv. STAT. § 166.155(2) (1993); WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 9A.36.080(7) (Supp. 1996).
23 See, eg., 720 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West Supp. 1996) (increase of one to three years);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 574.090(1)(2)(Supp. 1993) (increase of up to seven years); On. REv. STAT.
§ 166.155(2) (1993) (increase of up to five years); WAsH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(7) (Supp.
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In sum, for purposes of exposition, I shall take bias crime statutes
to enhance the penalties for "specified acts" undertaken "because of"
"specified characteristics," where the general content of these terms is
understood as lying within the ranges described above.
II.

Ti

WRONGDOING-CULPABILITY FRAMEWORK

In this Part, I develop the framework that will be used in assessing potential justifications of bias crime statutes. The framework is
based on the concepts of wrongdoing and culpability. As discussed
below, the wrongdoing-culpability framework provides a theoretical
structure for understanding how the elements of offenses and defenses
properly may bear on the penalties established by the criminal law.
Employing this framework to analyze bias crime statutes has
three virtues. First, wrongdoing and culpability, the basic components
of the wrongdoing-culpability framework, are explicitly moral concepts. Thus, analysis within this framework will facilitate an examination of the moral soundness of bias crime statutes. Second, the
wrongdoing-culpability framework exposes the variety of ways that a
feature of an act may be relevant either morally or with respect to the
criminal law. Thus, the framework should be useful in generating theories
concerning how bias crime statutes might be justified. Third, examining
possible justifications of bias crime statutes within this
framework will allow these justifications to be considered
systematically.
This Article's analysis of bias crime statutes rests in part on the
soundness and completeness of the wrongdoing-culpability framework. In particular, the analysis assumes that to the extent that bias
crime statutes cannot be justified within the wrongdoing-culpability
framework, they are unjustified. This approach to bias crime statutes
thus places weight on the validity of the framework. Besides setting
forth the wrongdoing-culpability framework, this Part seeks to
demonstrate that the framework is clear and coherent, normatively
appealing, descriptively consistent with the core of our criminal law
system, and sufficiently explanatory to be resilient in the face of limited instances of nonconforming data. Thus, it is contended, the
weight can be borne.
The following subparts place the wrongdoing-culpability framework within the larger constellation of moral theories, explain the
concepts of wrongdoing and culpability, and show how the framework
explicates existing criminal law.
1996) (increase up to five years). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a three-level
penalty increase, which, in rough terms, is equal to approximately three years. U.S. SENTENCING
GUmELrNEs MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A-Sentencing Table (1995).
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A.

Three Theories of Punishment

The wrongdoing-culpability framework considers the criminal law
from the perspective of morality. There are three basic categories of
moral theories concerning the justification for establishing criminal
sanctions: utilitarianism, retributivism, and hybrid (or mixed) theories.
According to utilitarian theories, criminal sanctions should be established only where they would confer some net benefit or desirable
consequence upon society at large, such as the protection of citizens
from harm.24 Under this view, sanctions may be justified on the
grounds that they deter (generally or specifically), incapacitate, reinforce social norms, satisfy a desire for revenge, or rehabilitate, where
rehabilitation is understood as eliminating the propensity to engage in
crime rather than improving the character of the criminal for its own
sake. According to retributivism, establishing sanctions for a class of
acts is justified only where the sanction is, in some sense, deserved by
the individuals who engage in the acts. Under this view, the social
effects that follow from the sanctions are irrelevant. Sanctions are justified by being an appropriate response to the offense itself. Sanctions
respect a wrongdoer's right to punishment, prevent the gaining of an
unfair advantage, or give wrongdoers their due.25 Alternatively,
under retributivism, sanctions may be understood as restoring the
moral order that the wrongdoers have breached.26 Finally, hybrid theories combine the justification requirements of both utilitarianism and
retributivism. According to hybrid theories, neither social utility nor
considerations of desert alone are sufficient to justify punishing individuals. Rather, sanctions may be imposed only where they both confer some net benefit on society and are deserved by the actor in light
of the offense itself.27
For our purposes, the critical question will be whether bias crime
statutes punish within the limits established by retributivism.
Although I shall not argue for it at length, the ability of utilitarianism
to account plausibly for the wide range of substantive and procedural
rights afforded by our current criminal justice system is dubious. 28
24 See MARX TuNJicK, PuNisvtmr THEORY AND PRACrICE 69-84 (1992); H.L.A. Hart,
Murder and Principles of Punishment. England and the United States, in PuMsHMNrr AND RESPONSIBILrY: ESSAYS IN ThE PHILosoPHY OF LAW 54, 72-86 (1968); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74. CRLIm. L. &. CRIMINOLOGY 343, 351-53 (1983).
25 See TuNicK, supra note 24, at 84-106; John Cottingham, Varieties of Retributivism,29 PmL
Q. 238 (1979) (distinguishing different brands of retributivism).
26 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, REThINKN CUMnAL LAW 416-18 (1978); Michael S. Moore,
The Moral Worth of Retribution, in REsPoNsmmrrY, CHARACrERS, AND Tm EMOTIONS 179

(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 347.
27 See Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit ofJust Punishment,41 EMORY LJ. 1059, 1062 &
nn.4-8 (1992); Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 354-57.
28 See, eg., HJ. McCloskey, A Non-UtilitarianApproach to Punishment,in CONTEMPORARY
UT=rrARmIASM 239 (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1968); Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and
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The criticisms that undermine utilitarianism generally apply with particular force in the context of the criminal justice system. Utilitarianism has been faulted for lacking principles about how benefits and
burdens are to be distributed over individuals. Distributional considerations are particularly relevant in the context of criminal justice because the burdens imposed are potentially so harsh. For example,
utilitarianism would recommend such counter-intuitive practices as
punishing minor offenses severely and convicting those known to be
innocent if sufficient deterrence was achieved. Absent some requirement of desert, utilitarianism, to its discredit, results in individuals being used as mere means to an end.29 If bias crime statutes are to be
justified, then they must be justified under retributive or hybrid theories. These two sets of theories, however, collapse to one on the assumption that the first requirement of the hybrid theories-the net
social benefit requirement-is satisfied. I am willing to make this assumption in light of the increased deterrent and incapacitation effects
that usually accompany increased penalties. If the first requirement of
hybrid theories is thus satisfied, the only remaining question for hybrid theories with respect to bias crime statutes is the question posed
by retributive theories: Do those whom bias crimes statutes punish
deserve to have their punishments enhanced? This question of desert
shall be the primary, though not exclusive, focus of this Article.
B. Wrongdoing and Culpability Underlie Desert
The concepts of wrongdoing and culpability underlie the normative concept of desert, and hence the retributive theories of punishment against which bias crime statutes will be measured. Retributive
theories come in two stripes: objective and subjective. Under objective theories, the punishment that an actor deserves may be analyzed
as a function of the wrongdoing engaged in by the actor and the actor's culpability for that wrongdoing.3 0 Wrongdoing is acting in a
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control,94 YALE L.J. 315 (1994); Andrew Von Hirsch, Desert,in PI-IosopIy OF LAW 573 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 2d ed.

1980).
29 The principle that individuals should not be treated merely as a means to an end is associated with Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 100 (L.
Beck trans., 1959). Kant himself may not have thought that laws, to merit our adherence, must
incorporate this principle. See Jeremy Waldron, Kant's Legal Positivism, 109 HARv. L. REV.
1535, 1540-43, 1558-60 (1996). Nevertheless, intuitively the principle's appeal is strong in the
area of punishment for criminal acts.
30 See R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY & CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF AC17ION
AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 103 (1990); FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 454-59; Heidi Hurd, What in
the World is Wrong, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 157, 158 (1994); Frederick M. Lawrence, supra
note 10, at 354 (citing ANDREW VON HmscH, PAST OR FUTruRE CRIMES 64-67 (1985)); Michael

S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 237,
237 (1994).
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manner that violates moral norms concerning conduct. If Abe took
Bob's umbrella without permission, Abe would have engaged in
wrongdoing because he would have violated the moral norm, "Do not
cause another to be deprived of property without permission."
Wrongfulness reflects the moral quality of an act violating a norm.
The greater the harm, and under some theories, the greater the act's
proximity to harm, the greater the wrongfulness.3 1 Wrongfulness is
clearly a foundational moral concept. It is based on the notion that
our freedom is bound by norms of conduct. Furthermore, wrongfulness captures the intuition embedded in our grammar that one is punished for something. The "something" is the wrongdoing. The
concept of wrongdoing is consistent with a wide range of ethical theories because the concept itself carries no implications concerning what
the proper norms of conduct are.
Under objective retributive theories, desert is not simply a matter
of wrongdoing. There also must be culpability. Here "culpability"
means something like "accountability" or "responsibility" for the
wrongdoing.3 2 The basic intuition underlying culpability is that it is
unfair to punish someone for engaging in a wrongdoing, such as causing an injury to another, unless in light of certain features of the
wrongdoer, she can be held accountable or responsible for the wrongdoing. The wrongdoing must somehow reflect on the wrongdoer who
would be punished for the wrongdoing. For example, we would not
think that punishment was proper for an actor who injured another as
a result of coercion by a third person. In contrast to norms of conduct, which are first-order principles for guiding for an actor's behavior, principles of culpability are second-order principles for evaluating
the actor in light of her behavior, its conformity with the norms of
conduct, and other factors.
Under objective retributive theories, two well-recognized conditions give rise to culpability for wrongdoing. These conditions concern the actor's attitude-broadly construed-toward the
31 See FLrTcimR, supra note 26, at 473.

32 To avoid confusion, I shall adopt the convention of using the term "culpability" to refer to
moral culpability. When I wish to refer to culpability in the sense of satisfying the culpability
conditions of a generic or particular penal statute, I shall use the term "legal culpability."
Furthermore, my use of "culpable" should be distinguished from a second, equally common,
use of the term. Often, it is said that because of greater accountability for a given wrongdoing,
an actor is more culpable, i.e., blameworthy or deserving of greater punishment. As used in this
latter sense, "culpable" is very close to "deserving of punishment." Hence, under this use of
"culpability," a wrongdoing-culpability theory of punishment becomes a theory that employs a
concept ("culpability") very close in meaning to one ("punishment") that it seeks to explicate.
Adopting this alternative use of "culpability" would require describing the "wrongdoing-culpability theory of punishment" as the "wrongdoing-accountability theory of culpability." My use
of "culpability" appears more consistent with the relevant literature. See Fxr.crR, supra note
26, at 495 (using "culpable" synonymously with "accountable for a wrongdoing"). But see Christine Sistare, Agent Motives and the Criminal Law, 13 So. TH. & PRAa 303, 307 (1987).
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wrongdoing. The first culpability-creating attitude is intending. An
actor is culpable for his intentional wrongdoing. For example, because causing a death is a wrongdoing, an actor will be culpable for
causing the death if he did so intentionally. 33 The second attitude giving rise to culpability is believing, or more generally, assignment of
likelihood to a state of affairs. Even if an actor does not intend to
engage in wrongdoing, she may be culpable if she believed she was so
engaged, or at least if she assigned a sufficiently high likelihood to the
possibility that she was so engaged. Beliefs may vary depending on
the degree of confidence with which the beliefs are held. The more
confident an actor is that his acts involve wrongdoing, the more culpable the actor will be (assuming that culpability is not predicated on
intent). For example, an actor who was certain that his act would
cause a death is more culpable for the death than the actor who
merely thought it somewhat likely that his act would cause a death.
Negligence, understood as an attitude of carelessness toward the consequences of one's actions, is also commonly recognized as a culpability-creating condition. 34
In contrast to objective versions, subjective versions of retributivism focus on mentally represented, rather than actual, wrongdoings. 35
The subjectivist assesses the desert of an actor by considering the
wrongdoing the actor intended to engage in, believed she was engaging in, or should have believed she was engaging in, regardless of
33 In the course of this Article, I use "intentionally" so that P intentionally causes C if and
only if P intends to cause C. Thus, as I shall use it, "intentionally" is equivalent to the awkward
construction "intendingly." Although this use of "intentionally" may be narrower than countenanced by ordinary usage, see DuFF,supra note 30, at 77-78, it is useful where confusion is not
created.
34 Negligence is not an actual propositional attitude as are intending and believing. Negligence, however, may be thought of as a counterfactual propositional attitude because a negligent
actor is one who, if he were reasonable, would have been aware of the risk of his act being
wrongful and acted otherwise. Loosely, the negligent actor is attributed the beliefs he would
have had if he were reasonable, and his culpability is assessed accordingly. For example, Abe
would be (morally) culpable of negligently taking Bob's umbrella where Abe (1) did not know
the umbrella was Bob's, (2) would have know this if he had been reasonable, and (3) on the
assumption that if he had known this, would be considered culpable for taking the umbrella.
There are alternative conceptions of criminal negligence. Indeed, the nature of criminal
negligence and the degree to which it properly supports liability have long been debated. See,
e.g., Larry Alexander, Reconsideringthe RelationshipAmong Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and
Negligence in the CriminalLaw, 10 Soc. PIL PoL'y (1994); Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior
Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L.REV. 632, 635-43 (1963); H.L.A. Hart,
Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in PuNisHmErN AND REsPONSmlnxry: EsSAYS 1N Tkm PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136 (1968); Kenneth W. Simons, Culpabilityand Retributive

Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J. CoNTEMP. L. IssuEs 365 (1994).
35 Cf Michael S. Moore, PrimaFacie Moral Responsibility, 76 B.U. L. Rav. 319,321 (1996)
("Culpability could thus be said to be wrongdoing in a sense. Namely culpability is wrongdoing
in the possible world created by our representational states. Wrongdoing itself, by contrast, is
wrongdoing in the actualworld, not in a possible world."). For an example of subjective retributivism, see Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CoNmap. LEG.Issuts 1 (1994).
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whether the wrongdoing actually transpired. Culpability for this possible wrongdoing is established by whether it was intended, believed
in, or merely should have been believed in, in order of decreasing culpability. In general, objective and subjective theories of retribution
will prescribe the same punishment when the possible wrongdoing
that is the object of the actor's culpable attitude is the wrongdoing
that the actor actually commits. Objectivists and subjectivists, however, divide over cases where the actor's beliefs or intents about what
36
will happen differ from what actually happens.
Although these objective and subjective theories of retribution
may differ concerning the punishment deserved by persons in certain
situations, they share the same fundamental concepts of analysis:
wrongdoing and culpability. Strictly speaking, under subjectivism,
there need not be an actual wrongdoing in order for punishment to be
deserved. But we may say that both objective and subjective theories
analyze situations of punishment in terms of the wrongfulness of a
state of affairs (whether actual or represented) and conditions of culpability (intended, believed likely, etc.) with respect to that state of
affairs 3 7 Furthermore, under both objective and subjective theories,
wrongdoing and culpability are conceptually distinct components for
determining desert. As noted, wrongdoing is based on norms of conduct that should guide actors; culpability is based on principles for
evaluating the actor for the conduct at issue. Although there may be
cases in which it is not clear whether a particular fact is relevant to
assessing wrongdoing or culpability, there is a clear distinction between asserting that the fact is relevant to one or another. Likewise,
at this stage of the inquiry into bias crime statutes, we cannot rule out
that a particular fact may be relevant for both wrongdoing and culpability, depending on what the proper substantive norms for wrongdoing are and what the proper principles for evaluating the actor are. In
this case, one fact would be morally significant for two reasons. Nevertheless, even if it turns out that they share common elements, the
categories of wrongdoing and culpability are conceptually distinct and
so may be investigated independently.

36 This division is the root of the so-called problem of moral luck. See Sanford H. Kadish,
Foreword:"CriminalLaw and the Luck of the Draw, 84 . CruM. L. & CRIMINOLoGy 679, 680 n.5
(citing extensive literature).
37 See Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Harm and Evil in CriminalLaw: A Study in Legislative

Deception?, 5 J. CoNT E. LEG. Issuns 299,299 (1994) ("[W]hile the occurrence of the harm or
evil may not be important to the subjectivist, the natureof the harm or evil intended or risked is
important to determine the degree of the actor's culpability."). In my discussion of bias crimes, I
shall generally not distinguish between objective and subjective theories of punishment. I assume that where issues of moral luck do not arise, arguments explicitly stated in terms of one
theory could be restated in terms of the other.
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C.

Wrongdoing and Culpability Underlie the Criminal Law

Besides underlying the normative concept of desert, wrongdoing
and culpability provide a framework for organizing the enormous
body of rules, doctrines, and principles comprising substantive criminal law. On its surface, criminal law appears to divide into two categories: offenses, that body of law that prohibits conduct subject to
punishment, and defenses, that body of law that negates or mitigates
punishment. The wrongdoing-culpability framework replaces this dichotomy with the deeper one of norms of conduct (defining wrongdoing) and principles of evaluation (defining culpability).
Under both objective and subjective versions of retributivism, the
moral concepts of wrongdoing, culpability, and desert neatly map onto
and explain the legal concepts of prohibited conduct, legal culpability,
and liability. The wrongdoing-culpability theory thus provides a
framework for analyzing the elements of criminal offenses. Under the
Model Penal Code, for example, the acts that are required to commit
an offense (also known as the "actus reus") are acts that typically violate moral norms and so constitute wrongdoings. Furthermore, the
Model Penal Code requires that to be liable for committing a prohibited act, the actor must act purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.38 The Model Penal Code refers to these states as "kinds of
culpability" (also known as "mens rea").3 9 The types of culpability
required under the Model Penal Code thus generally correspond to
those culpability-producing attitudes identified in the wrongdoing-culpability theory.
The wrongdoing-culpability theory, besides providing a framework for conceptualizing offenses, also provides a framework for conceptualizing defenses. Defenses are understood as negating either the
wrongfulness of the prohibited act or the culpability of the actor for
the wrongful act. Those that negate wrongfulness are called justifications; those that negate culpability for a wrongful action are called
excuses. An example of the former is self-defense. 40 Pursuant to this
defense, the wrongfulness associated with the use of force is deemed
negated by the greater benefit of preventing an unlawful attack. The
actor is still responsible for doing what he did; other circumstances or
38 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(l)-(2) (1962).

39 Not every offense in the Model Penal Code is explicitly formulated in terms of one of
these four categories of legal culpability. For example, regarding the offense of rape, rather than
using any of these terms, the Code requires that the perpetrator "compel[ ] [his victim] to submit

by force or by threat" to intercourse. Id. § 213.1(a). This phrase can, however, be construed as
"employ force or threat for the purpose of" having intercourse. Thus, the offense of rape carries
with it the culpability associated with purposefulness or pursuant to § 2.02(3), recklessness.
40 Id. § 3.04 (1962). See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v.
Reasons, in HARM AND CuLPABLIY 45, 52-54 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996) (discussing objective nature of Model Penal Code's self-defense doctrine).
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consequences, however, have cleansed the doing of its wrongfulness.
The duress defense is an example of an excuse. A person who acts
under duress is not liable for an intended wrongdoing because, even if
the doing was ultimately wrongful, she is deemed not responsible, and
so not culpable, for her wrongdoing.
Duress, however, does not ne41
gate the wrongfulness of the act.
A comparison of the moral and legal terms under discussion is
illustrated in the chart below:
LEGAL

EXAMPLES

Prohibited Conduct
(Actus Reus)

Causing a death

Defenses of
Justification

Saving a life
Stopping Attack

MORAL

Causing a Injury

+
Legal Culpability
(Mens Rea)

Intending result
Anticipating result

Defenses of Excuse

Actingfrom Threat
Reasonable Mistake

Culpability

L iab I
Liabilityfr rm

Deserving
Punishment

The chart is intended to illustrate the similar contours of the wrongdoing-culpability framework and the criminal law, rather than imply a
point-by-point correspondence of the two systems. Such a correspondence is not to be expected due to many "real world" concerns that
our criminal justice system must respond to, such as the limits of the
system to implement fine distinctions with consistency. Nevertheless,
on a more abstract level, a similarity of structures is discernable. This
similarity supports the contention that besides underlying our concept
of desert, the concepts of wrongdoing and culpability underlie the positive criminal law. Thus, they provide a prime facie plausible framework for examining bias crime statutes.
41 Although the general correspondence between justification and wrongdoing, on the one
hand, and excuse and culpability, on the other, is widely acknowledged, the details of the demarcation are debated. See, eg., Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justificationand Excuse, 84 COLuM. L REv. 1897 (1984).
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BIAS CRIME STATUTES ANALYZED WrrMN TE
WRONGDOING-CULPABILITY FRAMEWORK

Bias crime statutes enjoy broad support. Liberals view bias crime
statutes as a means to fight bigotry; conservatives see bias crime statutes as an opportunity to "get tough on crime." The enhancement of
penalties for bias crimes may be one of the few things on which liberals and conservatives can agree.4 2 Yet though their support may be
broad, the bases for justifying bias crime statutes are narrow. Based
on the previous part, only two such bases exist: one relating to wrongdoing and one relating to culpability. Specifically, for the increased
penalties established by bias crimes statutes to be justified, bias crimes
must involve either (1) greater wrongdoing than that found in crimes
that are similar but which lack the bias element triggering bias crime
statutes ("nonbias crimes"), or (2) with respect to a common wrongdoing, greater culpability for that wrongdoing than that found in
nonbias crimes. The challenge of justifying bias crime statutes is to
demonstrate how acting "because of' a specified characteristic increases wrongdoing or culpability in such a way.
This part undertakes a systematic examination of possible bases
for justifying bias crime statutes based on the concepts of wrongdoing
and culpability. Subpart III.A takes a first pass at bias crime statutes,
interpreting them under the model of traditional criminal offenses.
The purpose of this subpart is to show that a straightforward interpretation of bias crime statutes fails to yield a plausible theory of increased wrongdoing or culpability. Thus, the examination of more
novel interpretations of bias crime statutes is warranted. This examination occurs in subparts III.B and III.C. These subparts, comprising
the bulk of the Article, consider justifications of bias crime statutes
based on increased wrongdoing and increased culpability, respectively. Based on their analysis, this Article concludes the connection
between bias crimes and increased wrongdoing or culpability is
problematic. Thus, although not wholly defective, the foundations of
bias crime statutes are judged to be much shakier than generally
appreciated.
A.

Why Bias Crime Statutes Cannot Be Construed Conventionally

This subpart takes a first pass at bias crime statutes. Bias crime
statutes are, to the extent possible, construed as written and analyzed
in terms of the standard canon of concepts of the criminal law. This
approach, perhaps surprisingly, results in an interpretation of bias
crime statutes according to which the enhanced penalties they impose
42 See David Chang, Beyond Uncompromising Positions: Hate CQimes Legislation and the
Common Ground Between Conservative Republicans and Gay Rights Advocates, 21 FoRDmrM
UaB. LJ. 1097 (1994).
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are unjustified. Moreover, this conclusion rests in part on the very
principle of equality affirmed by defenders of bias crime statutes.
Construing bias crime statutes as typical criminal offenses is made
difficult by their use of the term "because of." The "because of" locution is not a common element in the definition of criminal offenses.
Acting "because of," however, appears closely related to acting with a
certain type of intention. Intentions are in the standard stock of criminal law concepts. If Joe commits an assault against a person because
the person is Jewish, Joe has committed a bias crime. In such a case,
we would say that Joe intends to assault a person who is Jewish. This
last statement, however, is ambiguous. Under one interpretation, it
may merely mean that Joe intends to assault a person and that person
happens to be Jewish. Let us put aside this weak sense of intends to
assault a person who is Jewish. The critical feature of the crime making it a bias crime appears to be that the victim's Jewishness was
within the scope of Joe's intention. For Joe to commit a bias crime,
not only must he have an intended victim who is Jewish, but he must
also have intended that his victim be Jewish.43
Generalizing from this example, bias crime statutes may be
thought of as general schemata for establishing enhanced penalties for
acts committed with a particular set of intentions. Those intentions
("bias intentions") would be intentions to commit acts of the form:
Injuring a Black
Killing a Black
Robbing from.a Black
Injuring a White
Killing a White
Robbing from a White
Injuring a Jew
Killing a Jew
Robbing from a Jew
In each of these instances, the race, religion, or other specified characteristic is included as part of the description of the action that the
actor intends to commit. Bias crime statutes thus appear to differ
from those creating the underlying offenses (assault, murder, etc.) by
virtue of identifying a special category of intentions to be punished
more harshly than those that might accompany the underlying offense
in a nonbias case.
Although the above rendering of bias crime statutes appears
plausible, the rendering makes bias crime statutes substantively unjustified. Bias intentions are different from, but not worse than, the intentions underlying nonbias crimes. Compare a bias crime against a
Black and a similar crime in which bias is not involved. The bias crim43 One cannot, of course, intend that a particular person, P, be Jewish. A person cannot
"intend" that a fact be the case unless she believes that she has some control over the occurrence
of the fact. For example, a person cannot intend that it will stop raining. A criminal, however,
has control over whom he will victimize and, in that sense, can intend that the indefinite person
who will be his victim be Jewish. In this sense, a criminal can intend his victim to be Jewish. See
MICHAEL S. MooRE, Acr AND CRIME: THE PHmtosopHy OF ACMbON AND ITS IMPUCATIONS FOR
THE CImAL LAv 202-05 (1993) (discussing intending attendant circumstances).

1033

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

inal intends to, say, "inflict wrongdoing W on a Black," and the
nonbias criminal simply intends to "inflict wrongdoing W (on an indefinite person)." As discussed previously, intentions establish the
scope of a person's legal and moral culpability-a person is culpable
for what he intends. Based on their intentions, the bias criminal will
be culpable exactly for inflicting wrongdoing W on a Black, and the
nonbias criminal will be culpable exactly for inflicting wrongdoing W
on an indefinite person.44 Inflicting wrongdoing W on a Black and on
an indefinite person, however, are types of wrongdoing of equal gravity: the gravity associated with wrongdoing W. Thus, although the
perpetrator of a bias crime, by virtue of his intention, is highly culpable for an act such as "inflicting wrongdoing W on a Black" and the
perpetrator of a nonbias crime does not have that level of culpability
for such an act, these differing culpabilities do not justify different degrees of punishment. Rather, both perpetrators deserve the same
punishment because they have the same degree of culpability (that
associated with intentionality) for wrongdoings of the same gravity
(inflicting wrongdoing W on a Black and inflicting the same wrongdoing on an indefinite person).
The above argument may seem to presume its conclusion. The
gravity of a wrongdoing, W, it may be thought, cannot always be defined independently of the object of the wrongdoing. After all, punching a person is a greater wrongdoing than punching a pillow. The
object of the wrongdoing, however, is only significant insofar as it may
be ascribed special rights or entitlements. It is a greater wrong to
punch a person than a pillow because persons have a higher moral
status than pillows. In contrast, as a general matter, all persons have
an equal right to be free from physical harm and other sorts of wrongdoing; none may claim a superior status. Although there may be limited exceptions (saints, innocent children, etc.), exceptions should not
be a function of race, color, or religion. This claim follows from the
44 Here I employ a "fine-grained" theory of intentions. According to this theory, intentions
are individualized based on whether the person holding the intentions would recognize the
meaning of the propositional objects of the intentions to be the same. For example, if a person
took the expression "unmarried man" to mean the same as "bachelor," then in intending to meet
an unmarried man, the person would also intend to meet a bachelor. In contrast, if the person
took the expression "fortunate man" not to mean "bachelor," then if he intended to meet a
bachelor, he would not intend to meet a fortunate man, even if he believed that all bachelors and
only bachelors were fortunate. See generally Michael S. Moore, Intention and Mens Rea, in Issuns IN CoNTEMoRARY LEGAL PILosoPHY 245,253-62 (1987) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of different theories of intentions). Thus, in the context of bias crimes, a perpetrator who
intended to assault a greedy person would not intend to assault a Jew even if the perpetrator
believed that in assaulting a greedy person he would be assaulting a Jew (assuming that the
perpetrator did not take being Jewish as a criterion for greediness). By adopting a fine-grained
theory of intentions, I do not vouch for the ultimate coherence of the theory. Rather, I adopt it
to identify my use of the term "intention," believing that any incoherence does not infect the
contexts in which I use the term.
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principle of equality that as all are created equal, race, religion, and
national origin are morally irrelevant. Accordingly, it is no greater (or
lesser) wrongdoing to steal from a Black than a White and no greater
(or lesser) wrongdoing to punch a Jew than a gentile. The bias criminal, of course, denies this principle, believing it is less of a wrongdoing
to transgress against members of a certain group. Paradoxically, the
very principle of equality he denies-and that supporters of bias crime
statutes usually affirm-protects the bias criminal from enhanced punishment for the transgression.
In response, it may be contended that there are limited exceptions to the general principle of equality invoked above. One might
believe, for example, that Blacks who happen to live today have a
special moral status because they once were subject to slavery and
oppression. On this basis, it may be argued, Blacks have particularly
strong rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These rights
may support special claims to public educational resources or government contracts. Under this "affirmative action" theory of bias crime
statutes, when these rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
are intentionally violated, the violator becomes culpable for a particularly great wrongdoing, which justifies the enhanced penalties bias
crime statutes impose. Similarly, it may be argued that Blacks are
particularly vulnerable to wrongdoing because the same wrongdoing,
in some sense, is a greater wrongdoing when imposed on Blacks.
Such theories, however, have two faults. First, according to these
theories, it would be justified to enhance the punishment for a person
who merely knowingly assaulted a Black, because that person would
also be culpable for the particularly great wrongdoing of assaulting a
Black. Yet it is counterintuitive that a mugger who decides to attack
the first person who comes along, and before engaging in the mugging,
sees that the person is Black, should thereby be subjected to a harsher
penalty. Second, such a theory could not account for the fact that bias
crime statutes apply to crimes committed because of every race, color
or religion. It is logically impossible that members of all races and
religions have particularly strong rights or be particularly vulnerable,
just as it is logically impossible that everybody be above average.
Such an "affirmative action" theory therefore, even if it were plausible
with respect to Blacks, could not justify the broad reach of bias crime
statutes over crimes committed against those of every race, religion,
etc. Defenders of bias crime statutes rarely argue that penalty enhancements are justified for bias crimes against members of certain
groups and are unjustified in other cases.45
45 It has been argued even if the primary rationale for bias crime statutes is the greater
wrong bias crimes inflict on ethnic and other minorities, the broad reach of bias crime statutes to
bias-motivated crimes againt nonminorities is nonetheless justified. According to this argument,
the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on racial and other classifications requires that bias
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In sum, construing bias crime statutes under the traditional model
of criminal offenses fails to yield a sound interpretation. This model
assumes (1) the "because of" element of bias crime statutes can be
interpreted as criminalizing intentions of a particular sort, and (2) intentions determine the scope of the wrongdoing for which the actor is
culpable. The model concludes that bias crime statutes are unjustified
because there is no greater wrongdoing within the scope of the
criminalized intention. This conclusion, however, may seem unpersuasive. Rather than accept it, one might decide that the traditional
criminal law model of offenses is too restrictive. To justify bias crime
statutes, a more novel understanding of the "because of' element, the
wrongdoing at issue, or the type of culpability involved must be found.
The next subpart begins this project by examining wrongdoings arguably associated with bias crimes, but not necessarily within the scope of
so-called bias intentions. Thus, the next subpart (as well as the one
after it concerning theories of greater culpability) starts afresh on the
problem of justifying bias crime statutes.
B. Problems with Theories of Greater Wrongdoing
This subpart considers and criticizes wrongdoing-based theories
of bias crime statutes. According to these theories, the wrongdoing
justifying the penalties attached to bias crimes is not just the wrongdoing associated with the underlying nonbias offense committed by the
bias criminal. Rather, bias crimes involve an increased or additional
wrongdoing.
The conclusion that bias is relevant for wrongdoing would have
implications beyond the primary one of providing a theoretical foundation for bias crime statutes. One implication would be for the scope
of accomplice liability for bias crimes. Consider the following hypothetical: Mob Boss wants to retaliate against a rival gang by killing
one of its members. Mob Boss must choose between assigning the
task to Earl or Fred. Earl is an anti-Semite and will look for a Jewish
member of the rival gang to kill. In contrast, Fred will simply kill the
first member of the rival gang whom he encounters. Mob Boss, knowing the routines of the members of the rival gang, knows that the first
gang member either Earl or Fred will encounter will be Jewish, and so
crime statutes not be limited in scope to crimes where the victim is a minority. See Grannis,
supra note 7, at 224-25. If, however, perpetrators of bias crimes on nonminorities do not deserve
to have their penalties enhanced, the Equal Protection Clause should not be construed to require it. Not punishing those who do not deserve to be punished seems a compelling state interest. A statute, unlike all existing bias crime statutes, which applied to only bias crimes against
minorities would be narrowly tailored to achieve this end because it would punish exactly the
group that deserved it-those who commit bias crimes against minorities. Thus, justifications for
existing bias crime statutes, which apply to minority and nonminority victims alike, cannot be
backed into through reliance on the Equal Protection Clause.
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knows that whomever he chooses for the assignment will kill a Jewish
member of the rival gang. Mob Boss, however, is wholly indifferent as
to which member of the gang is killed and whether that person is Jewish. Assume that Earl is convicted of committing a bias crime on the
ground that he killed "because of religion." As a matter of morality,
not positive law, should Mob Boss be punished more severely for
choosing Earl? On the one hand, if bias crimes entail greater wrongdoing, as opposed to greater culpability for a given wrongdoing, Mob
Boss should be punished more severely. Mob Boss, in choosing Earl,
would be responsible for the' greater wrongdoing Earl committed because Mob Boss knew that Earl would engage in such a wrongdoing.
On the other hand, if bias crimes merely entail greater culpability for
a given wrongdoing, Mob Boss should not be punished more severely.
The wrongdoing for which Mob Boss is culpable, the killing of a member of a rival gang, is not greater than usual, and there is no reason to
hold Mob Boss particularly culpable since he did not act because of
religious bias.46
This subpart focuses on two wrongdoing-based theories of bias
crime statutes. According to these theories, bias crime statutes are
justified because, in contrast to nonbias crimes, they (1) violate a person's right not to be discriminatorily harmed, or (2) result in secondary harms such as feelings of apprehension in the victim's
community. I conclude that although both theories are suggestive,
only the second plausibly accounts for the greater wrongdoing of bias
crimes. The assumption that bias crime statutes rest on a theory of
secondary harms, however, renders bias crime statutes susceptible to
the criticism that they do not address these harms as effectively as
alternative statutes that do not employ bias as an element.
1. Theories Based on the Right Not To Be Discriminatorily
Harmed.-The right not to be discriminatorily harmed is a theoretical
entity which, if sound, would imply the greater wrongdoing of bias
crimes. Such a right would play for bias crimes a role analogous to
that which a person's right not to be physically injured plays for assault. Just as an assault is an instance of wrongdoing because it violates a person's right not to be physically injured, so a bias crime
would constitute a distinctive wrongdoing because it would violate a
person's right not to be discriminatorily harmed.
Two clarifications should be made concerning the right not to be
discriminatorily harmed. First, the right not to be discriminatorily
46 Cf. Wilson v. People, 87 P.2d 5, 6-8 (Col. 1939) (discussing whether a person may be liable
for burglary as an accomplice where that person aids in the commission of burglary by principal,
but lacks mental state of intending that a theft be completed). Both Wilson and bias crime
statutes raise the question whether certain mental states should be thought of as part of the actus
reus, which may be attributed to an accomplice, or mens rea, which is personal to the actor.
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harmed is intended to be a right over and above the general right not
to be harmed. In this sense, the right not to be discriminatorily
harmed is different in kind from, say, the right not be harmed on
Monday. Although a person may be said to have a right not to be
harmed on Monday, such a statement is best understood as merely
asserting a right that is an aspect of, not an addition to, the general
right not to be harmed. Similarly, a person may be said to have a right
not to have her rights violated. Yet such a statement should not be
construed to imply that an incident of trespassing violates a right to
exclusive possession of property and the additional right of not having
that right violated. Like these ersatz rights, the right not to be discriminatorily harmed can only be violated if another right is also violated. In this respect, the right not to be discriminatorily harmed
would differ from most other rights. However, unlike the violation of
the ersatz rights above, the violation of the right not to be discriminatorily harmed is taken to carry independent moral weight. 47
Second, the right not to be discriminatorily harmed is intended to
be distinct from such rights as the right not to be offended or humiliated.48 Such rights might be violated as a consequence of a person's
learning that he has been harmed because of his race or other specified characteristic. It is possible, however, that the victim of a bias
crime may not learn that she has been the victim of discrimination and
so no offense or humiliation would occur. The right under consideration here is intended to be one that is violated whenever there is a bias
crime: a right not to be discriminatorily harmed per se.
The existence of a right not to be discriminatorily harmed has
intuitive appeal for some. 49 Many people feel that discrimination is
47 The interest in not being discriminatorily injured, insulted, etc., may be said to "supervene" on the interests in not being injured, insulted, etc. A type of property, A, supervenes on
another, B, if and only if the A-properties that a thing has are wholly dependent of the Bproperties of the thing, yet the A-properties are not reducible to the B-properties. For example,
some philosophers believe that mental states supervene on physical states because, even though
mental states are not physical states, the physical states that a person is in wholly determine the
mental states that the person is in. See THE CAMBRIDGE DIClIONARY oF PH[LOsOpHY 778-79
(Robert Audi ed., 1995).
48 A possible justification of bias crime statutes based on such an interest is considered in
section III.B.3., infra.

49 Intuitions vary concerning whether there is an interest in not being harmed discriminatorily, over and above the interest in not being harmed. Compare Frances M. Kamm, Philosophy
of Punishment Enhancement,1992/1993 AN. SuRv. AM. L. 629,631 ("It was certainly not worse
for the white person that he was injured because he was white."), with Kenneth W. Simons,
Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 463, 512-14 (1992) ("A harm inflicted with a serious
mental state sometimes inherently inflicts a greater harm to a victim.... The relevance of mental
states to the victim's harm should not be overstated. When the basic harm is very serious, it is
doubtful that the additional insult alters the utilitarian calculus."), and John A. Powell Rights
Talk/Free Speech and Equality, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 587, 590-91 (finding it undeniable
that harms committed because of bias are qualitatively different than otherwise similar harms),
and James Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation: Where's the
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wrong and that the wrong is a wrong against the victim of the discrimination. Such a view may be suggested by employment discrimination
laws. Because the law generally does not recognize a right to employment, and consequential offense or humiliation need not be shown,
the wrong of employment discrimination appears to be a violation of
the right not to be discriminatorily harmed. In the following subsections, I will argue that there is no good moral basis for recognizing a
right not to be discriminatorily harmed. Furthermore, this conclusion
does not threaten the soundness of civil antidiscrimination laws, such
as employment discrimination laws, which can be reconceptualized as
resting on a different right or otherwise distinguished.
a. Interest in others' thoughts.-The right not to be discriminatorily harmed, although intuitively appealing for some, is also
somewhat mysterious. It may be difficult to see how violating a right
discriminatorily can constitute a wrongdoing over and above the violation of the underlying right. The alternative picture of the evil of discrimination is easily understood. Under this picture, when a person
acts, he must abide by the moral principles that govern the situation:
Where a promise is at stake, he must act in ways that respect the
promise; where limited resources must be divided, they must be divided based on the appropriate factors of need, right, and so on; when
dealing with another, persons should act in ways that reciprocate the
ways that they have been dealt with. All of these situations involve
basic moral principles. These principles will usually identify factors
that will indicate what options are open to the actor. In general, acting on the basis of race and the other specified characteristics will lead
an actor to behave inconsistently with the moral principles because
race, etc., will not be a relevant factor. For example, failing to fulfill a
promise because the promisee is Asian will generally lead to the unjustifiable breaking of a promise because race has nothing to with the
conditions under which promises may be broken. Acting on a discriminatory basis therefore produces wrongdoing only because it leads
to acts inconsistent with basic moral principles. Thus, the putative impropriety of discrimination may be accounted for without recognizing
a wrong in biased action over and above that of violating the basic
moral principles.50
The way to avoid the above picture of discrimination is by
straightforwardly thinking of the right not to be discriminatorily
Speech?, Cm. JusT. Errncs 6,9 (Fail/Summer 1992) ("[B]eating someone because of animosity
to the color of his skin is, at least according to my intuition, more morally reprehensible than
hitting someone because of a dispute about a parking space.").
50 See JosmH RAZ, Tim MonALrry oF FREEDOM 217-44 (1986) (discussing the limited content of egalitarian theories); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537,
548-77 (1989) (arguing that equality is not a distinct substantive norm).
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harmed as resting on a protectable interest in the thoughts of another.
Under this conceptualization, engaging in a bias assault is like stealing
a person's cane and hitting him with it: not only has the perpetrator
violated the person's interest in bodily integrity, but the perpetrator
has done it in a way that treads on another's interest in controlling his
personal property. In the case of a bias assault, the additional interest
is not in personal property like a cane, but in the perpetrator's
thoughts.5 ' Conceptualizing the distinctive wrongdoing of bias crimes
as resting on a protected interest in the thoughts of another is a purely
analytic move intended to bring the substantive moral issues into focus. Although there may be other ways of framing the issue, the same
moral issues will ultimately have to be faced.
Recognizing a protectable interest in the thoughts of others of the
type necessary to support bias crime statutes requires that two hurdles
be cleared. The first is the "what you don't know, can't hurt you"
objection. According to this objection, a person can only have an interest in that which produces an effect on her; that which has no effect
cannot implicate an interest. Thoughts fall into the latter category of
things that can have no effects on others. Thoughts are paradigmatically private things. We think of them as distinct from their contingent physical manifestations, such as a voluntary movement or an
involuntary blush or smile. So conceived, thoughts can have no effect
on others, although their physical manifestations might. Is it irrational
to be concerned with things that do not affect you? Surely not. In
many cases, a person's most intense interests will include interests in
the welfare of others. Parents care deeply about the lives of their children. A person may fervently wish to end or ameliorate starvation in
Africa. Such interests are independent of whether the others' welfare
ever produces an effect on, or even becomes known to, the person
holding the interest.
Furthermore, the criminal law recognizes people's interests in
matters that neither affect them nor are derived from the interests of
others who are directly affected. The criminal law prohibits the abuse
of corpses, the violation of privacy (which is commonly done through
wiretaps that the victim is unaware of), cruelty to animals, and desecration of venerated symbols. 52 All of these crimes prohibit conduct
without any requirement that any direct affects be produced on any
51 The grammar of "discriminatorily harmed" tends to mask this conceptualization of bias
crimes as a crime of thought. "Discriminatorily harmed" appears to refer to being subject to a
particular type of conduct like being "quietly burglarized" or "quickly mugged." Nevertheless,
what distinguishes harms committed discriminatorily from other harms is exactly the thought
that lies behind them. Likewise, formulations of bias crime statutes in terms of victim "selection," see supra notes 14-15 and the accompanying text, tend to suggest that a particular type of
conduct-selection-is at issue. But what distinguishes selection from other types of conduct is

the mental state of the selector.
52 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 251.10, 250.12, 250.11, 250.9 (1962).
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"victim"; it is no defense that any of these acts occurred in perfect
privacy. Although, of course, the perpetrator will know that the crime
has been committed, it is not the perpetrator's interests that are considered impaired. Furthermore, although the crime must of course be
discovered before it can be prosecuted, the discovery is not an element of the crime. The privacy of thoughts is no per se bar to recognizing an interest in the thoughts of another.
This brings us to the second hurdle, which will prove near insurmountable. In order to establish a protectable interest, a person must
show that a matter she is concerned with is properly viewed as her
concern, rather than somebody else's. This will be more difficult in
cases where the matter does not directly affect her. People often care
deeply about what opinion others have of them and want others to
think well of them, even if they are never to learn of the opinion.
People may care more about these unknown opinions than whether a
corpse is abused or a symbol denigrated. In these latter cases, the
perpetrator has no claim to the use of the corpse or symbol and so the
society's concern with these matters governs. In contrast, with respect
to thoughts, the natural tendency is to see them as the concern of the
thinker, rather than the object of the thought. An interest in the
thoughts of others is generally not recognized: If another thinks
poorly of us despite our best efforts, we must live with that fact.
These intuitions concerning thoughts are supported by Professor
Feinberg's general analysis of the concept of interest. Feinberg states,
"[I]t does not seem likely that wants, even strong wants, are sufficient
to create interests. '5 3 Feinberg gives the example of a baseball fan
who, despite his powerful desire that the Dodgers win the pennant,
has no interest in their winning. Feinberg contrasts this case with that
of a baseball fan who has placed a wager on whether the Dodgers will
win the pennant. The difference according to Feinberg is captured by
the concept of a "stake."54 Feinberg opines that it is widely true that:
if [the concern] is to be the ground of an interest... [it] should be
capable of promotion by human efforts, particularly by the efforts of the
person whose want it is .... Without that special relation to personal
effort that converts a mere want into an objective, it is not likely that the
appropriate sort of "investment" can be made that is needed to create a
"stake" in the outcome.55
Feinberg's analysis of interest as based on the notion of a "stake"
or "investment" is supported by one aspect of the law's treatment of
thoughts of others. Through the tort of defamation, the law recognizes a limited interest in the thoughts of others. An action for defamation has traditionally been viewed as protecting "the interest of a
OTmRS 42 (1984).
54 Id.at 34 ("One's interests, then, consist of all those things in which one has a stake ....
55 Id.at 44.
53 JOEL FENBER(O, HARM TO
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person in his reputation. '5 6 A person's reputation is nothing more
than what others think of him-the thoughts of others reified. Why
should the law recognize such an interest? A person has some stake
in these opinions because, through her work to establish her good
name, she is indirectly responsible for them. A person who disturbs
these opinions through deception or carelessness cannot claim an
equivalent stake. Honest work supports a claim superior to one based
on dishonest or accidental influence. A plaintiff, of course, cannot
successfully assert an action in defamation against a person or class for
negligently arriving at an improperly low opinion of the plaintiff. The
interest in reputation does not extend that far. By deliberating, the
opiner directly produces the opinion and so has a stake in it that
trumps any claim that the object of the opinion may have. Thus, the
law of defamation is generally in accord with Feinberg's analysis of
interest.
With respect to bias, the victim lacks a significant stake, and so
interest, in the attitudes of the bigot. Few individuals can claim responsibility for the reputation of their group. Although society as a
whole, through its efforts to eliminate prejudice, may have some interest in the thoughts of bigots, this interest also cannot trump the interests of the bigots, who take ultimate responsibility for their views.57
Bigotry involves the erroneous assessment of the worth and dignity of
a large class of persons. In moral matters, we have made a particularly strong investment of ourselves. Our ability to appreciate, grapple with, and take positions on moral issues is a defining characteristic
of our autonomy. 58 Our conclusions on moral issues, for better or
worse, define who we are. In refusing to recognize an interest in the
thoughts of others, 59 the law affirms our conception of personhood56 LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, TmE LAw op DEFAMATION 2 (1978).

57 Any conception of bigotry that places the responsibility for it elsewhere would undermine

the conception of bias crimes involving punishment for discriminatorily causing harm. If the
bigot is not responsible for it, he should not be punished for it.
58 See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 36-37 (1986) (discussing importance of moral auton-

omy); Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime Sentencing
Enhancement and FirstAmendment Theory, CrM. JusT. ETmcs, Summer/Fall 1992, at 29, 32
("[A]bsent governmental respect for the sanctity of an individual's thought processes, any meaningful individual self-realization is impossible.").
59 The First Amendment properly protects freedom of thought. See Thrner Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S. CL 2445,2458 (1994) ("At the heart of the
First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas
and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of

Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not
require citizens to display state motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds."); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting the right to receive and process ideas is part
of First Amendment); American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,408 (1950); West
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629, 642 (1943) (protecting religious beliefs
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the understanding that we are distinct individuals with particular
claims to our lives, thoughts, and identities.
Moreover, even where thoughts lead to actions affecting others,
we generally do not believe that others acquire an interest in the actor's thoughts. Consider, for example, a person who refuses to consider someone as a potential spouse solely on the basis of the person's
race.60 Many would view such a refusal as manifesting bad character.
Spouse selection, however, involves determining with whom one will
enter into the most intimate of relationships. Most would not think
such refusal merited punishment as violating another's interest in being considered as a potential spouse. Their reaction would more likely
be, "I disapprove, but it's your business." Similarly, if a person were
to choose the charities she donated to based on racial or other considerations (the United Negro College Fund versus the Native American
Rights Fund), we would not think punishment was warranted. We
might think that the donator would be more praiseworthy if bigotry
had not played a role in determining the recipient. We believe, however, that a person may be beneficent for the reasons she chooses.
Thus, just as pure thoughts do not violate the interests of others,
neither do thoughts leading to actions that do not impose harms.
With respect to bias crimes, the crucial question is whether the
victim should somehow gain a protectable interest in the perpetrator's
thoughts because these thoughts lead to a harmful hct Against the victim. It is instructive that tort law declines to view an interest in
thoughts as being created in this way. Damages in tort may be compensatory or punitive. The compensatory damages a plaintiff is entitled to reflect the extent to which her interests have been impaired. In
core torts, compensatory damages do not depend on motivation. For
example, a person who received a black eye as a result of another's
negligence would be entitled to the same compensatory damages as a
person who received the black eye as a result of an intentional battery.
The principal rationale for suing in battery, and bearing the burden of
proving the additional element of intent, is the availability of punitive
damages. 61 Punitive damages, however, are generally not thought of

from being undermined by requiring pledge of allegiance to be taken); United States v. Schimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654 (1929) ("If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought.") (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
60 By "solely," I mean without regard to future possible consequences based on the racism of
others, such as potential ostracism and stigmatization that our society may impose on both interracial couples and their children.
61 Punitive damages are frequently appropriate for intentional battery and rarely for negligence. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 40-41 (5th
ed. 1984).
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as compensating the plaintiff for the violation of an interest.62 Rather,
the purpose of punitive damages is, as the name implies, to punish.63
Punitive damages are appropriate for conduct based on malice, evil
motivations, or outrageous circumstances.64 As a matter of positive
tort law, bias motivation would seem an appropriate ground for punitive damages. Thus, in tort, bias motivation, like intentionality generally, does not reflect the existence of a distinct interest the violation of
which is to be compensated, but rather it reflects an assessment of the
appropriate punishment of the tortfeasor based perhaps on some notion of heightened culpability. 65 In any case, tort law does not support

the hypothesis that a victim acquires an interest in the thoughts causing a wrongdoing against him.
Our intuitions about whether we should recognize an interest in
bias motivations that cause harm are not completely settled. There
are admittedly conflicting possible conceptualizations of the place of
motivations in bias crimes. Under one conceptualization, a bias crime
is seen as involving only the perpetrator's act entering the victim's
sphere of interests with the perpetrator's thoughts staying outside and
behind with the perpetrator. Under a second, a bias crime is seen as
involving a perpetrator's thought entering with his act into his victim's
sphere of interests where it is properly subject to objection by the victim. Analogies to stakes and investments may not tell the whole story.
It is true that often we identify what is ours with what we have invested ourselves in. If a person builds a cabin and it is destroyed, he
may feel that he has lost more than if a cabin that was given to him
were destroyed. Yet besides identifying with what we produce, we
also identify with what has produced us. If her childhood home is
destroyed, a person may feel that part of herself has vanished. From
this perspective, where a person's life has been altered by, say, a violent, crippling attack, we may feel that the motivation giving rise to
the attack has more to do with the victim's life than the attacker's.
In many areas of morality, difficult questions will arise and the
most that can be achieved through analysis is an understanding of why
they are difficult. With respect to the generic bias crime, the balance
of considerations seem to favor the view that the perpetrator's motivations remain the perpetrator's. Those who violate the rights of
others are still autonomous individuals who, in violating the rights of
62 One indication that punitive damages are not viewed as compensatory is that they are
generally taxed as income, as opposed to tort awards for lost earnings, which are not taxed. See
Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff's Economic Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1900, 1917 (1992). Only compensatory awards should not be taxed

because the nature of compensation is to return a person to the status quo, not produce an
increase in wealth to which society might assert a claim.
63 Id. at 1900-11.
64 KEETON, supra note 61, at 9-10.

65 Whether bias is properly thought relevant to culpability is discussed infra in subpart III.B.
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others, have exposed themselves to punishment for the wrongfulness
of their acts, not for the thoughts underlying these acts. They have a
stake, hence an interest in their thoughts; others can only confess to
their preference not to have been the subject of a bias crime, as opposed to another crime the same in all other respects. Even when
racism, anti-Semitism, and other forms of bigotry have impinged on
our lives, we should recognize that we still have no claim on the
bigot's thoughts. This respect is not based on the value of bigotry, but
the value of the bigot as a person whose moral beliefs, though profoundly wrong, are still his. Sanctity of thought prevails.
Granting that we generally do not have interests in the thoughts
of others leads to what might be a controversial conclusion: Discrimination is not intrinsically or per se wrong; at most, it only tends to
produce wrongdoing. The following subsection examines civil antidiscrimination laws in light of this conclusion.
b. Civil antidiscriminationlaws.-On the basis of the foregoing claims about the protectable interests of others, the justification
of civil antidiscrimination laws may seem problematic. Bias crime
statutes and civil antidiscrimination laws are closely related. Civil'antidiscrimination laws share the defining feature of bias crime statutes:
the prohibition of conduct engaged in "because of" (or alternative locution) a specified characteristic. 66 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has recognized the similarity of the two types of laws. In Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, the Supreme Court cited the analogy between presumptively
constitutional civil antidiscrimination laws and the challenged bias
crime statutes as a ground for upholding the latter. 67 Similarly, those
who have defended bias crime statutes have appealed to civil antidiscrimination laws as evidencing our society's recognition of a general
interest in not being the subject of discrimination. They argue that the
wrong that occurs when a person is fired based on race is the wrong of
being subject to discrimination. 68 Such a theory is undoubtedly suggested by the remedial structure of such laws as Title VII, which allows a plaintiff to recover wages that she would have received but for
the apparent wrong of discrimination. If not for this, what wrong is
being remedied? I have argued that a general interest in not being
66 See, eg., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a) (voting: "on account of'), 2000a(a) (public accommodations: "on the ground of'), 2000c-6(a)(2) (public education: "by reason of'), 2000d (federally
funded programs: "on the ground of"), 200Oe-2(a) (employment practices: "because of'), 3605
(real-estate transactions: "because of'), 6102 (age discrimination: "on the basis of') (1994).
67 508 U.S. 576 (1993). One commentator suggests that this analogy was the true impetus of
the Court's decision. See Richard Cordray, Free Speech and the Thought We Hate,21 Omo N.U.
L. Rnv. 871, 884 (1995).
68 See, eg., Weinstein, supra note 49, at 14; Cordray, supra note 67, at 884 (arguing that
intentional selection is a separate wrongful act distinct from innocent conduct of hiring and
firing).
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subjected to discrimination would imply an inappropriate interest in
the freedom of thought of others. Below I offer two theories of antidiscrimination laws that do not rest on a general right not to be subject to discrimination. These theories do not represent the standard
understanding of antidiscrimination laws. Nevertheless, they may represent a sounder understanding. They also illustrate that objecting to
bias crime statutes on the grounds discussed in the previous section
does not entail a wholesale rejection of our nation's antidiscrimination
laws.
Civil antidiscrimination laws need not be understood as resting
on a general right to be free from intentional discrimination. Under
the first theory I suggest, they may be understood as resting on a general interest in employment if sufficiently qualified. In our society,
employment is not considered a luxury, but a necessity of life.
Although unemployment insurance is available, dependency on such
insurance is generally regarded like reliance on medical insurance: a
departure from the normal state of well-being. Furthermore, in our
society, the baseline expectations are to be hired if sufficiently qualified relative to the application pool and to be retained as an employee
if competent, assuming that maintaining the position is economically
justified for the employer. When these legitimate and natural economic expectations are defeated, a person may be characterized as
having suffered a harm, rather than as not having received a benefit.
Thus, all instances of unreasonable hiring and firing appear to violate
harm-avoiding norms of conduct of the type the law traditionally enforces. The harm underlying employment discrimination laws, I suggest, is not in being the victim of racial motivation per se, but in being
deprived of the legitimately expected employment opportunity that
69
necessarily accompanies being the victim of racial discrimination.
Why then should not all objectively unjustified employment practices be prohibited on the ground that they deprive a person of a legitimately expected employment opportunity? The explanation lies not
69 A theory of prohibiting employment discrimination that does not rest on a general interest
in being free from discrimination is supported by Title VII jurisprudence. Title VII prohibits socalled "disparate impact" discrimination as well as intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that requiring a high
school diploma as a condition of employment could violate Title VII if the requirement was not
related to job performance. Plaintiffs were not required to show that the employer intended or
even was aware that the requirement have a disparate impact. Rather, the Supreme Court held
that, under Title VII, job applicants had a right to be free from arbitrary barriers to employment
that fell particularly heavily on groups defined by the Title VII classifications. Id. at 431. It was
irrelevant whether thoughts of discrimination produced the arbitrary barrier. Although this
nonthought-related justification was offered in the context of disparate impact discrimination, it
would suffice to justify the prohibition of intentional discrimination. Intentional discrimination is
simply a subclass of disparate impact discrimination because all intentional discrimination has a
disparate impact on the group intentionally discriminated against.
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in the lack of harm in the general case of an unjust firing or failure to
hire, but in the unacceptably high enforcement costs of prohibiting
such a harm. A common rationale for not recognizing a tort of wrongful discharge or unjustified failure to hire is the potential for the
courts and businesses to be overrun with lawsuits brought by unhappy
applicants and disgruntled former employees. 70 Relative to other alleged unreasonable bases for hiring and firing, allegations of discrimination because of race or other specified characteristics have a high a
priori likelihood of being true. In our society, the prohibited categories of discrimination are likely the most common forms of unreasonable employment practices. Other putatively common forms, such as
personal animosity, are only large because they aggregate bias (a frequent cause of personal animosity) and a range of other less-probable
unreasonable bases, such as irrational dislikes of objectively acceptable attitudes, manners, or appearances. In other words, race and
other specified characteristics are the features that persons are most
likely to be unreasonable about. To allow types of employment claims
other than those alleging bias discrimination would be to allow claims
that carry greater costs in the form of meritless lawsuits. Thus, an
available justification for prohibiting discriminatory employment
practices while permitting other unreasonable employment practices
is not that the former incorporate the additional harm of discrimination, but that the latter bear disproportionately high enforcement
costs.
In sum, pursuant to the account I have been sketching, the difference between bias crime statutes and other antidiscrimination laws,
such as Title VII, is that bias crime statutes enhance a penalty for an
act that is already punished commensurate with its wrong. The penalties that civil antidiscrimination laws assign to acts of discrimination
are appropriate given the wrongful nature of the acts, but the acts are
not wrongful by virtue of the discrimination. They are just more worthy of being prohibited because of their relatively low enforcement
costs. Under this view, bias crime statutes would be analogous to unemployment discrimination laws only under the following circumstances: First, it would have to be shown that the general penalties for
all crimes were artificially lowered so that there was general "underpunishment" of crime relative to desert; second, bias crime statutes
70 See Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Employment at will...
keeps debates about business matters out of the hands of courts."); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. Clu. L. REv. 947,965-67 (1984); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D.
Polsby, Just Cause for Termination: Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY Li. 1097, 1144
(1989) ("[R]eplacing the at-will rule with some form of governmental review of dismissal decisions will be costly."); Grannis, supranote 7, at 219 ("Being fired or not hired is harmful to the
individual. Nonetheless, such harmful employment actions are tolerated because they are necessary to business."); see also Ricffam PosNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSiS OF LAW, 206-07 (4th ed.
1992) (defending the efficiency of at-will employment).
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merely enhanced the penalty for crimes to a level appropriate for the
punishment of the underlying crime; third, there was an enforcementbased rationale, as opposed to a desert-based rationale, for why bias
crimes, and not other crimes, were being punished at the appropriate
level.
It is doubtful that these elements could be shown. For example,
our society has a general interest in increasing the punishment level
for crimes to their desert-based maximum in order to create the maximum deterrent effect. To the extent we have not, this may be explained by limits on available prison space and the costs of
incarceration. These two factors that would justify underpunishment,
however, apply with equal force to bias crimes: those who commit bias
crimes cost as much to incarcerate and deplete the limited amount of
prison space as much as nonbias criminals.
There is an alternative way of conceptualizing civil antidiscrimination laws so that they do not rest on a general right in not
being discriminatorily harmed. I have urged that we should not understand ourselves as having an interest in the thoughts of others.
Nevertheless, such interests may be created or transferred just as interests in other things may be. One mechanism for acquiring interests
is through promise. We ordinarily should not think of ourselves as
harmed by the low esteem in which we may be held by another, even
if we would greatly prefer it otherwise. Theoretically, however, one
person may promise another to consider him in the best light. In such
a case, action manifesting a failure to do so would provide evidence
that the promise had been broken and the promisor had wronged the
promisee. Vows to love, honor, and respect of the type exchanged in a
marriage ceremony perhaps present a more realistic example of this
type of interest in the thoughts of another acquired through promise.
Explicit promises not to discriminate are rare. Besides explicit
promises, however, there are tacit ones and, more distantly, hypothetical ones. The general obligation to obey the law, for example, may be
thought to rest on such a tacit or hypothetical promise. On such a
view, the acceptance of the benefits of society constitutes the acceptance of an agreement to obey the laws.71 In this light, the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on state action based on racial animus is
easy to justify: individuals may be generally free to discriminate, but
by accepting the power of government office, they tacitly or hypothetically waived their freedom to exercise this power discriminatorily.
Civil antidiscrimination laws regulate paradigmatically socially constituted spheres of activity such as schools, public accommodations, and
71 See A.J. SIMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 83-100 (1979) (arguing Locke held this view); H.LA. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? in THEORY OF RIGHTS
84-87 (J. Waldron, ed., 1984). But see ROBERT NozlrC, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 90-96
(1974) (criticizing the view).
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the market, where more than a minimum number of persons are involved.72 These institutions only exist through the mutual participation of a significant number of people and the background conditions
established by the state. Entering into these activities, a person may
be thought to have done so on the condition, tacitly or hypothetically
agreed to, that the activities would not be conducted discriminatorily.
On this account, civil antidiscrimination laws properly reflect the interest in the thoughts of others that accompany these socially constituted activities.
In contrast, crime, besides being an antisocial activity, is also an
asocial activity. It is not that crime does not involve others; the existence of an identifiable person other than the perpetrator who is
harmed is an element of most crimes. Nor is crime's asocial nature
premised on the notion that the relation between perpetrator and victim is a private or intimate one such that considerations of privacy and
autonomy protect it from government interference. There is no relationship with which government interference is more appropriate. 73
Rather, crime is asocial in the sense that it is unintelligible to think of
criminals as entering into agreements with either their victims or society at large to perpetrate crimes in only a nondiscriminatory way.
Criminal activity takes place beyond the pale of society. Such activities are paradigmatically unregulated and unlicensed behavior. Indeed, only because criminal activity could take place in a pure state of
nature would people, on some accounts, be justified leaving that
state.74 It makes no sense to think of criminals agreeing to select their
victims in a nondiscriminatory way because criminals do not agreeeven implicitly or hypothetically-with their victims or society to anything. Thus, unlike the activities regulated by civil antidiscrimination
laws, bias crime statutes apply to activities in which no amount of freedom of thought has been waived.
On the basis of the preceding views of civil antidiscrimination
laws, it may be conceded that discrimination is generally not a wrong
in itself of the sort that might support bias crime statutes, but nevertheless discrimination is properly prohibited by civil antidiscrimination laws.
2. Theories Based on Secondary Harms.-A second approach to
bias crime statutes identifies the relevant wrongdoing as the causing of
72 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b)(1) (public accommodations), 2000e (employment), 3604(B)(2)
(fair housing) (1994).
73 Analogies between the private aspect of kissing and the private aspect of punching are
misplaced. Cf. Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws Are Thought Crime Laws, 1992/1993 ANN.
Sutrv. AM. L. 509, 526 ("The State could not constitutionally require persons to offer kisses on
an equal opportunity basis. Punches are certainly less pleasant, but they are no less private.").
74 See THOMAs HOBBEs, LEvIATHAN 80 (Crawford B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
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"secondary harms." Where an underlying offense is committed because of bias, additional harms to the individual victim, the victim's
community, and society often ensue. Professor Lawrence, for example, has identified "a heightened sense of vulnerability"75 and "depression or withdrawal, as well as feelings of anxiety and helplessness
and a profound sense of isolation" 76 as part of the emotional and psychological ills suffered by the victims of bias crimes. Regarding the
victim's community, its members "perceive [the bias] crime as if it
were an attack on themselves" and "experience reactions of actual
threat. '77 Moreover, bias crimes "may ignite intercommunity tensions
that may be of high intensity and of long-standing duration. '78 Finally, bias crimes decrease our society's respect for the individual, violate the egalitarian ideal that supports our culture, and deprive our
society of the contributions of those who have withdrawn because of
bias crimes.79 These harms may be called secondary harms because
they ordinarily could not occur without the primary harm produced by
the underlying crime. On the basis of these secondary harms, Lawrence argues that the principle of proportionality80justifies punishing
bias crimes more severely than underlying crimes.
The central difficulty with identifying the greater wrongdoing in
bias crimes with the secondary harms described above is that bias
crime statutes do not directly enhance the penalty for crimes involving
that wrongdoing. Rather than directly requiring that a secondary
harm occur, bias crime statutes enhance penalties when the underlying crime is committed because of a specified characteristic. Acting
because of a specified characteristic thus is employed as a proxy (or
surrogate) for the occurrence of the secondary harms that are advanced as justifying the penalty enhancement of bias crime statutes.
In this section, I assume that the causing of secondary harms is wrongfu181 and consider the appropriateness of using thoughts, such as bias
75 Lawrence, supra note 10, at 343.
76 Id.
77

Id at 346.

78 Id.
79 Id at 347.

80 Id at 348-68; see also Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crime Statutes: Just Constitutional Wise?,
1992/1993 ANNs. SURv. AM. L. 485, 486 ("The distinct emotional harm to the particular victim,
and the harm felt by members of the victim's group are therefore at the heart of the matter.").
81 Although I shall not pursue it, an independent issue is whether causing secondary harms is
wrongful and should be prohibited by the criminal law. An argument against this prohibition
might rest on an analogy between bias crimes and homosexuality. I and many others believe
that homosexual conduct should be legal. It is not that we necessarily approve of homosexuality
or think that it is a "good" which outweighs, in a utilitarian sense, the alleged evils that flow from
it. Rather, we think that persons have the right to determine with whom they will have sex and
this right trumps the interests of others in not being offended or living in a society that has a
marginally greater degree of social cohesion. Cf. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF

MoRALs 9-20 (1965) (arguing homosexuality may lead to the corruption of youth and the loss of
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motivation, as a proxy for such wrongdoing. I conclude that, although
the issue is far from clear, there are sound reasons to doubt the appropriateness of employing bias in such a way.
a. Proxies in the criminal law.-In the criminal law, proxies
are the exceptions rather than the rule. With respect to the paradigm
criminal offenses, such as murder, assault, endangerment, arson, and
robbery, proxies are not employed. Rather, the causing of the harm
justifying the punishment is an element of the offense. "Causing the
death of another human being"-the wrongdoing that justifies the
enormous penalties for murder-is explicitly incorporated into the
definition of murder.8 2 Likewise for the range of inchoate and accessorial offenses, the relevant harm is explicitly83stated in the either incomplete or entered into underlying offense.
Admittedly, there are borderline cases in which it will be difficult
to determine whether an element of an offense identifies a factor directly relevant to wrongdoing or culpability, is being used as a proxy,
or both. Consider the role of age in the criminal law. Being below a
fixed age may be understood as a proxy for lack of maturity or respon-4
sibility, and so exempts a person from the scope of the penal code.8
Nevertheless, age may be alternatively understood as itself relevant to
culpability pursuant to the normative principles that (1) persons over
a certain age should be mature enough to be responsible for their acts
(even if they in fact are not), and (2) persons under a certain age deserve a certain span of years during which to develop outside of the
destructive reaches of the criminal justice system and should not be
penalized for achieving maturity early. More peripheral offenses,
such as prostitution, abuse of corpse, desecration of venerated objects,
or wagering on official action, 85 while arguably involving large measures of intrinsic wrongdoing, also are understandable in terms of secondary social harms with which the offenses are associated. In
general, the more debatable and peripheral the offense, the more nuthe community's moral cohesiveness). Similarly, one might argue that relevant principles of
freedom of thought trump individuals' interests in avoiding the secondary harms that bias crimes
produce. Cf.Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in Retribution,5 L CONTEMP. LEG. IssuEs
283, 287 n.12 (1994) ("The harm of hate crimes... is inpart a function of the degrading and
humiliating message conveyed by the conduct. Thus such crimes may be in tension with the
liberal commitment to freedom of thought and expression.").
82 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (1962).
83 For intent-based retributivists, it is sufficient that the harm merely be intended by the
perpetrator. For harm-based retributivists, the harm is made more proximate by the attempt,
agreement, or other act triggering the inchoate offense. In both cases, however, the relevant
harm can be found by examining the face of the relevant offenses.
84 See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10 (1962).
85 See, eg.,

id.§§ 243.2, 250.9,

250.10, 251.2.
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merous the alternative justifications advanced that might support it.86
Not all of the harms underlying these manifold justifications commonly will be contained in the face of the offense. Such offenses,
however, are not counterexamples to the general rule that where the
relevant wrongdoing is clearly identified, the wrongdoing is explicitly
prohibited.
Where proxies are understood as being used, the validity of their
use is often questioned. The felony-murder rule is commonly understood as employing the participation in a felony as a proxy for the

intent to kill.8 7 Strict liability offenses, such as adulteration of food,

statutory rape, and selling alcohol to minors, are often construed as
employing circumstances as proxies for intent or recklessness. 8 However, the felony-murder rule has been the subject of continuing scholarly scorn. 89 Strict liability offenses are few, carry limited sanctions,
and are subject to constitutional limitations. 90 Possession offenses also
have been viewed skeptically. 91 State courts have struck down a variety of laws that criminalize behavior that is not intrinsically harmful
but is perceived as correlated with social harms. 92 The use of proxies
undoubtedly makes for ease and efficiency in prosecution because the
prosecutor need only prove the existence of the proxy, not what it is a
proxy for. Yet when used without sufficient justification, they have, to
borrow Bertrand Russell's comparison
of faith and reason, all the ad93
vantages of theft over honest toil.
86 See FEINBERRG, supra note 53, at 13 ("Often the consequences of lewdness, homosexuality,
drug-taking, or gambling are said to be harmful to others in some very subtle way, or produced
by some partially concealed or indirect causal process. So much confusion has resulted from
these allegations that it has become far from evident just which crimes now on the books satisfy
the harm principle and which do not.").
87 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1962) ("One who kills in the course of armed
robbery is almost certainly guilty of murder in the form of intentional or extremely reckless
homicide without need of any special doctrine.").
88 Cf.Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 653 (1984).
89 See James J. Tomkovicz, The Enduranceof the Felony-MurderRule: A Study of the Forces
that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1431 n.9 (1994) (citing sources).
90 See I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUsTIN W. Scotr, JR., SuBsTANTrvE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.8(b)

(1986).
91 See FLETCHER supranote 26, at 197-205 (finding possessory offenses more consistent with
positivism than desert-based theories of criminal law); MOORE,supra note 44, at 22 ("In either
case, we do not really punish possession because that state is bad or harmful, but only as a proxy
for past acts (which we can't prove) or as a proxy for propensities for future acts (which we can't
punish because they haven't yet happened). .. Faced openly, impatience (for future crimes) and
inability to prove guilt (for past crimes) are not comfortable rationales for criminalizing
conduct.").
92 See LAFAVE, supra note 90, at 217-18 (curfews, possession of knives, possession of syringes, selling of magazines without covers).
93 See also CHAR.Es T. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON LAW OF EVIDENCE 811 (2d ed. 1972)

("The urge for simplifying the task of the prosecutor in certain cases by requiring the defendant
to go forward with evidence on some of the issuable facts is balanced by the very real fear that
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The criminal law's presumption against employing proxies rests
on the related grounds of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.
Offenses employing proxies are overinclusive because they allow for
punishment in cases where the proxy, but not the harm itself, is present. Such punishment is at least prima facie inappropriate because, all
things equal, a person should not be punished based on a harm that
has not occurred. Furthermore, where an offense is not defined in
terms of even risking the justificatory harm, a person could be subject
to punishment even if the likelihood of that harm had not been increased. Overinclusiveness thus may improperly penalize individuals
who fall within the excess coverage of the statute. Overinclusiveness
also yields little benefit for society because society has no interest in
punishing or deterring those who have neither done nor risked
wrongs. Offenses that employ proxies are also objectionable as underinclusive. Society at large may object to underinclusive statutes
because those who should be incarcerated because of their wrongful
acts, but are not within the scope of the statute, will not be incarcerated. Similarly, those who should be deterred from committing
wrongful acts, but who are not within the scope of the statute, will not
be. Furthermore, persons whose wrongdoings fall within the scope of
the statute may raise objections based on fairness: why should they be
subject to sanctions where others similarly situated with respect to the
justificatory harm are not? Although this latter objection may not be
strong enough to justify not applying the statute at all, it is nevertheless an objectionable feature of the statute.
Criteria are needed to determine when it is appropriate for the
criminal law to use proxies. Some criteria will be too weak. For example, in order for the use of a proxy to be valid, it is not enough that
there be a positive correlation being the proxy and the object of the
proxy. It has been asserted that penalty enhancement for bias crimes
is justified because the injuries produced by bias crimes are more severe than those produced by an "average crime." 94 Bias crimes thus
positively correlate with increased harm relative to the baseline of average crimes. Yet if a positive correlation of this sort were to justify
proxies, then it would have to be explained why the multitude of other
positive correlations between events and harms do not give rise to
enhancement statutes. For example, studies may show that injuries
are more severe where produced by assaults committed, for example,
on Saturday night, on nights other than Saturday, by spouses, by nongoing too far in this direction may result in substituting an inquisitorial procedure for our traditional accusorial system.").
94 See, e.g., Cordray, supra note 67, at 875 ("A third reason why it may be appropriate to
enhance the penalty for such crimes across the board is that often the harm perpetrated in any
particular such crime is more extensive and more severe than the harm perpetrated in an 'average' crime.").
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spouses, by men, by women, when the perpetrator is intoxicated, or
when sober. Yet we are not tempted to enact statutes that enhance
penalties based on the presence of such factors. Rather, in the case of
assaults, most jurisdictions employ aggravated assault statutes that are
drafted expressly in terms of "serious bodily injury" 95 -the underlying
harm. The reason that classes of wrongdoing should not be assigned
sanctions based on the average wrongfulness of the class members is
that the wrongdoing-culpability theory of punishment is a theory of
punishment for individuals, not classes. If all class members are punished based on the average wrongfulness of the class members, and if
the wrongfulness of class members varies widely, then many in the
class will receive more punishment than deserved and many will receive less. Only when a class consists of wrongdoings of relatively
similar magnitude will punishment based on "average wrongfulness"
be appropriate.
In determining whether a proxy is validly employed, we should
ask, at a minimum, whether its use results in outcomes with less overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness than the outcomes that would be
generated by employing statutes explicitly drafted in terms of the object of the proxy.96 Examples of statutes explicitly drafted in terms of
secondary harms rather than bias motivations include those that enhance the penalties where "[o]ffender acted with intent to inflict psychological injury on victim," 97 "[o]ffender recklessly created terror
within a definable community," or "[o]ffender acted in manner likely
to provoke retaliatory crimes. ' 98 These statutes could also be drafted
more broadly in terms of negligently risking the causing of secondary
harms. Another possibility is a statute modeled on the federal provision that enhances the penalties "[i]f the defendant knew or should
have known that a victim of the offense was particularly susceptible to

95 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(a) (1962).
96 See Kevin Cole, The Voodoo We Do, 5 J.CoNmT~m. LEG. IssuEs 31, 38 (1994) ("In assessing the case for [statutes proscribing conduct that does not invariably result in harm], care must
be taken to avoid justifying the restraint based on benefits that could be realized by a more
focused restraint on liberty."). For an illuminating discussion of the problem of proxies generally, see Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsumate Offenses, 37 Amiz. L.
REv. 151 (1995).
97 Cf.U.S. SENTENCaN GumauEtrNs MANUAL § 5K2.3 (1996) (providing for penalty en-

hancements in such cases).
98 Gellman provides various versions of laws that explicitly target crimes based on their secondary effects. See Gellman, supra note 73, at 511; see also Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes:
Crimes of Motive, Character,or Group Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN.SURV. AM. L. 605, 615. In my
discussion, I do not consider the possibility of alternative proxies for secondary harms. For example, a statute enhancing the penalty for crimes in which the criminal and victim were of different races, or in which places or worship were defaced, might be thought to better capture acts
with secondary harms than do current bias crime statutes.
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the crime.... ."99 I shall refer to statutes of these types as "secondary
harm statutes" because they are explicitly drafted in terms of the secondary harms advanced as justifying bias crime statutes. Framing the
question of the validity of using a proxy in terms of whether it is more
effective than a statute explicitly employing the proxy object implicitly
shifts the question of the justification of bias crime statutes from "Are
they justifiable where the alternative is having no statute at all concerning secondary harms?" to "Are they justifiable where the alternative may include adopting other statutes that address secondary
harms?" This shift, however, is legitimate because there is no reason
to believe that legislatures are limited to bias crime statutes, as traditionally drafted, or nothing.
b. Relative overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.-With
respect to overinclusiveness, secondary harm statutes have a slight
edge over bias crime statutes. Bias crime statutes are overinclusive
because there will be cases where a crime is committed based on bias,
but no secondary harms ensue. Some of these cases will occur when
the bias motivation is not apparent-for example, the damaging of a
car or other property, which appears to be a random act of vandalism,
but is really a random bias crime; or a dispute concerning a matter
which escalates into a brawl because of the racial animosity of one of
the participants, but which appears to be based entirely on the original
matter. In these cases, there will be no secondary harms. Another
scenario would be where the perpetrator has determined to commit
the crime regardless of who the victim is, but among potential victims
makes his selection because of some specified characteristic. Consider
for example, a con man who enjoys deceiving individuals"of a particular race or religion.100 In such scenarios, the bias motivation is
cloaked by the motivation for the underlying crime. There also will be
cases where bias motivation is present and obvious, but no secondary
harms occur simply because the victim cares litile about the motiva99 U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELms MANuAL § 3A1.1(b) (1996). The Sentencing Guidelines
provide for cases where the victim is both known to be more vulnerable-and so potentially
within the scope of the above-quoted provision-and where the perpetrator acts because of the
victim's race, etc. - and so is potentially within the scope of the federal bias crime statute, id at
§ 3A1.1(a). In such cases, the perpetrator's sentence is enhanced according to only the bias
crime statute, which is a greater enhancement than that provided by the vulnerability provision.
Id. cmt. n.3. This result is consistent with understanding bias crime statutes as using bias as a
proxy for greater vulnerability of the victim. The greater enhancement under the bias crime
provision may be explained based on the fact that the perpetrator of a bias crime must select his
victim intentionally, whereas the vulnerability provision is satisfied by merely knowing of
vulnerability.
100 Professor Greenawalt considers such scenarios and opines that the perpetrator would be
guilty of committing the crimes "by reason" of a specified characteristic. See Kent Greenawalt,
Reflections on Justificationsfor Defining Crimes by the Category of Victim, 1992/1993 ANN.
Surv. AM. L. 617, 618-19.

1055

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

tion of her attacker and the nature of the attack receives little
publicity.' 0 '

In contrast, there is virtually no chance that secondary harm statutes will produce overinclusiveness. Those who violate such statutes
will, by definition, have caused, or risked causing, secondary harms.
Of course, there is always the possibility in practice of a jury finding
secondary harms when none have occurred. But the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt should substantially diminish the
number of such convictions. In any case, the possibility of erroneous
conviction due to mistaken jury findings is always present. For example, although not noted above, there are hypothetical cases of bias
crime convictions where the underlying crime was not motivated by
bias, much less productive of secondary harms. The overinclusiveness
based on generic jury error for secondary harm statutes and the overinclusiveness based on generic jury error for bias crime statutes can be
assumed to cancel each other out. The cases of bias motivation without secondary harms, discussed in the preceding paragraph, however,
remain. Thus, the overinclusiveness of bias crime statutes, although
modest, is likely greater than that of secondary harm statutes.
Turning to underinclusiveness, we may identify two categories of
cases in which bias crime statutes will be underinclusive. The first category consists of cases where, even with perfect fact-finding, there will
be underinclusiveness. In this first category are cases of persons who
intentionally cause or risk secondary harms, but do not commit any
underlying crime, and so will not be liable for committing a bias crime.
Examples of such cases include a hatemonger who spreads rumors
that a nonbias crime was committed from bias and so fans the flames
101 The degree of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of bias crime statutes will of

course depend on how they are interpreted. Professor Lawrence, who believes that bias crime
statutes are justified because of secondary harms, argues that such statutes will be more defensible if construed narrowly to require racial animus. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 376-80. The
result of such a narrowing naturally would be not only to decrease overinclusiveness, but also to
increase underinclusiveness. This is so because the class of discriminatory selection crimes,
which would be entirely eliminated from the scope of bias crime statutes, contains both instances
where there are secondary harms and instances where there are none. Because individuals are
less offended by discriminatory selection bias crimes, such crimes will have a lesser tendency to
produce secondary harms committed compared to racial animus bias crimes. Nevertheless, they
will have some tendency. First, discriminatory selection bias crimes and racial animus crimes are
equally likely to produce fear and intimidation. For example, a person may be equally reluctant
to enter a neighborhood when believing those of her religion are considered easy marks for local
criminals as when believing those of her religion are disliked. Furthermore, discriminatory selection bias crimes are likely considered by some to be somewhat intrinsically offensive, even if less
than racial animus crimes. Finally, discriminatory selection bias crimes will produce secondary
harms where individuals or communities have mistakenly construed instances of discriminatory
selection as instances of racial animus. Whether eliminating discriminatory selection crimes
from the scope of bias crime statutes will improve them turns in large part on whether one is
more troubled by overinclusion or underinclusion.
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of hostility in a community; or a member of a terrorist group associated with a nationality or religion who takes "credit" for an act of
violence that his group did not commit. A more pedestrian example
would be the otherwise lawful use of racial or other epithets or symbolism that would wound the listener and the listener's community.
Because there is generally no underlying crime of hateful speech,
there would be no liability under a bias crime statute. Furthermore,
persons who cause or risk secondary harms by committing the underlying crime, but do not act from bias, will also not be liable under bias
crime statutes. Such persons will typically be involved in scenarios in
which the true nonbias motivation of the crime (personal animosity,
general hotheadedness, or unrelated emotional disturbances) is not
readily apparent to the public, but the perpetrator and victim happen
to be members of groups that are historically hostile to each other.
For example, a mugging of a Jew by a Black in New York City could
cause, or at least risk, secondary harms even if the mugging in fact was
merely motivated by greed; the vandalism or burglary of any house of
worship may produce secondary harms even where the vandalism or
burglary was not bias-motivated; or an attack on a member of a particular group committed as a rite of passage into a gang or committed as
a result of other types of peer pressure would produce secondary
harms but not be bias crimes, assuming that the perpetrator must be
acting from personal bias. °2
The second category of underinclusive cases will be those that
result from jury error. In such cases, the underlying crime was motivated by bias and secondary harms ensued, but the existence of bias
cannot be proven. The complexity of proving motive has been described as a "fundamental vice" of all bias crime statutes. 03 Prosecution under such statutes often will require substantial testimony
concerning a wide range of background matters normally not at issue
in criminal proceedings. 104 Furthermore, requiring that the accused
be found to be a racist, anti-Semite, or bigot may inject controversial
elements into the jury room, making unanimity difficult to achieve. 105
With respect to all these scenarios, a prosecutor concerned with punishing and deterring secondary harms might prefer a statute that sim102 See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement of personal animus.
103 Robert R. Riggs, Punishingthe PoliticallyIncorrect Offender Through "Bias Motive" Enhancements: Compelling Necessity or FirstAmendment Folly?, 21 Onso N.U. L. REv. 945, 952
(1995).
104 ItL. at 953 (identifying testimony from character witnesses; testimony concerning past expressions of intolerance, testimony concerning significance of hairstyle, tattoos, clothing, etc;
testimony concerning ideology of associates; and psychological testimony concerning "motivating thought").
105 See James B. Jacobs, Implementing Hate Crime Legislation Symbolism and Crime Control,
199211993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 541, 549-50.
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ply prohibited all conduct causing or risking them, rather than a
statute that required proving that the underlying criminal act was
committed because of a specified characteristic.
Secondary harm statutes do not suffer from the first category of
underinclusiveness; by definition, with perfect fact-finding, there will
be no cases in which secondary harms have been produced, yet there
will be no liability under secondary harm statutes. Secondary harm
statutes, however, raise concerns of underinclusiveness of the second
type: those based on juror error. Even if prosecutors are able to establish that a crime was motivated by bias, they may be unable to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that secondary harms were risked or
ensued. Juries, however, are often presented with evidence of motivation in order to infer other facts. Juries could be asked to find that the
defendant's acts created secondary harms on the basis of the fact that
the defendant acted from bias. Those who support bias crime statutes
based a theory of secondary harms should believe that the inference
from bias motivation to secondary harms is readily made.
Using motivation to establish the existence of secondary harms,
however, might be thought to raise particular difficulties. Juries undoubtedly are unaccustomed to ascertaining such diffuse facts as
whether a particular community felt vicariously victimized by an attack on one of its members or whether a particular crime wore away
at the fabric of its society. They may be unsure what the marginal
effects on society might be of a particular bias crime, and so acquit.
Yet it is unclear whether more accurate results would be had if the
determination was taken from their hands and they were given bias to
employ as a proxy for secondary harms. How confident are we that
bias-motivated crimes produce secondary harms? And to the extent
that we may be confident, why believe that juries will generally be less
so? We are not necessarily better situated epistemically than a jury.
Our common sense opinions about the way crimes are perceived and
affect different communities are the very same opinions that juries
would rely on if asked to determine if secondary harms were caused
by the accused.
In response, it may be argued that we are better situated than the
average jury to make determinations about the existence of secondary
harms because of subtle forms of bias infecting juries. Jurors, it may
be feared, will identify with the perpetrator on some level, discount
the humiliation felt by the victim, or be blind to the effects of the
crime on the victim's community. Thus, such bias will prevent jurors
from making the inferences to secondary harms that we recognize the
evidence objectively supports. Bias, however, does not blind one to
the existence of secondary harms. Indeed, part of the case for bias
crime statutes rests on the claim that bias criminals generally are
aware of, and should be held accountable for, the secondary harms
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they create. Furthermore, reluctance to draw the inferences required
to convict is equally present where the prosecution must show the
existence of bias as where it must show the existence of secondary
harms. Equally important, it is not clear that juries will suffer from
the biases hypothesized above. Where the accused has been portrayed as holding views that are strongly condemned by society, jurors
106
may be willing to stretch to make a finding necessary for conviction.
Finally, to the extent that there were grounds to doubt the fact-finding
abilities of juries with respect to secondary harms, these abilities could
be shored up through the use of rebuttable presumptions rather than
proxies. 107
The jury's ability to determine the existence of secondary harms,
however, may not be a crucial issue. Another alternative to existing
bias crime statutes could be drafted on the model of burglary. Just as
burglary is often defined as "an unlawful entry into a building with the
purpose to commit a crime therein,"' 08 so a bias crime statute might
provide for penalty enhancement where, "unlawful conduct is undertaken with the purpose to cause [secondary harms, however defined]
thereby."' 0 9 Such a statute would avoid the use of bias motivation as
a proxy, yet make it unnecessary for a jury to engage in fact-finding
concerning the existence of secondary harms. Instead, juries would
merely be required to make findings regarding intent. Here, again,
the issue is not so much whether juries, if posed this question, would
sometimes err. Rather, the question is whether employing an intentto-cause-secondary-harms standard would be a more effective means
of identifying those who are responsible for secondary harms than ap106 See Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a DiscriminatingTheory of Strict Liability,
28 AM. Cm. L. REv. 73, 101-02 (1991) (suggesting that if, in the absence of the felony-murder
rule, juries were asked to determine whether the defendant-felons intended the killing, they
would be likely to rely on common sense opinions concerning felons' characters "with a vengeance, attributing significance to them beyond their actual probative value").
107 Rebuttable presumptions are generally to be preferred to proxies because they are at least
somewhat responsive to evidence. See Robinson, supra note 88, at 656 ("A rule that creates a
presumption of a required element under circumstances that suggest that the element is present
but cannot be proven... can sometimes impute the element where the presumption is not in fact
warranted. Such errors may be an inherent cost of all evidentiary shortcuts, but certainly they
should be minimized where possible. Thus, we should prefer rebuttable presumptions to conclusive presumptions."). Indeed, with respect to weapon possession offenses, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code opted for the use of a rebuttable presumption of possession for criminal
purpose rather than complete elimination of a criminal intent requirement. See MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 5.06, 5.07 (1962).
108 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE § 140.25 (1996) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the second
degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a
crime therein .... ).
109 See Robinson, supra note 98, at 605 ("A promising alternative [to bias crime statutes] is
the criminalization of conduct that is intended to cause (or risk) intimidation or terror of an
identifiable group."). A law could also require that the secondary harms merely be negligently
or recklessly caused.
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plying a bias-based standard.110 Consider the not uncommon case of a
racial epithet used in the course of a brawl. Rather than asking a jury
to decide whether the defendant engaged in the brawl because of race
or whether the defendant's racism was inflamed in the course of the
brawl, it could more directly be asked whether in using the epithet the
defendant intended to humiliate or to wound the dignity of the victim.
If so, the determination that an enhanced sentence is appropriate
might be reached without considering the issue of whether the brawl
was racially motivated.
The preceding arguments suggest that bias crime statutes may result in greater underinclusiveness than alternative statutes. Nevertheless, this conclusion cannot be characterized as more than speculative.
It is clearly an empirical question as to whether statutes employing
bias motivation as a proxy, statutes explicitly drafted in terms of secondary harms, or some other alternative will be more effective in punishing and convicting those responsible for secondary harms. This
empirical question, however, has no clear answer. We have no data
concerning the effectiveness of actual bias crime statutes in targeting
those who cause secondary harms. By limiting its inquiry to the existence of bias, the criminal justice system can only presume a correlation. Indeed, we cannot even check the accuracy of a jury's factfinding regarding the existence of bias because the criminal justice system is currently our best means of ascertaining the truth in these matters."' We know even less about the potential effectiveness of some
of the hypothetical statutes suggested above that are drafted in terms
of secondary effects. In general, the uncertainty with respect to underinclusiveness will be greater than that with respect to overinclusiveness. Because of the likelihood of greater absolute amounts of
underinclusiveness, a potential exists for greatly different amounts of
underinclusiveness.
In sum, based on the preceding considerations, bias crime statutes' use of motivation as a proxy for bias appears insufficiently justified. Bias crime statutes have a greater potential than secondary harm
statutes for being overinclusive (e.g., for punishing those who have
neither caused nor risked secondary harms). In evaluating a criminal
statute, overinclusiveness will usually be a more significant factor than
110 With respect to bias crime statutes, Professor Greenawalt has suggested that they may be
understood as using bias motivation as a proxy: "[T]he disfavored motivations ordinarily connect
to .... results that are hard to ascertain but are particularly harmful.... [Intentions to humiliate
and intimidate] may sometimes be too subtle to make required elements of a crime." Greenawaft, supranote 98, at 624. Greenawalt adds, "[a] somewhat troubling feature of this argument
is the indirect aim at the really troublesome intentions, but ... such an indirect aim is sometimes
appropriate in criminal prohibitions." Id.
111 Regarding the deterrent effects of bias crime statutes, the data thus far is inconclusive. See
Project, Crimes Motivated by Hatred: The Constitutionalityand Impact of Hate Crime Legislation
in the United States, 1 SYPAcusE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 29, 64 (1995).
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underinclusiveness. This is so because, by general consensus, it is
worse to punish those who should not be punished than to permit
those who should be pumished to escape. Nevertheless, because the
potential overinclusiveness of bias crime statutes is only modest, their
overinclusiveness is not a compelling factor. With respect to underinclusiveness, secondary harm statutes also have a slight, if speculative,
advantage. The issue with respect to underinclusiveness, however, is
more difficult to assess because of the greater empirical uncertainties
involved.
c. Other considerations.-In the face of the empirical uncertainty identified above, it may be appropriate to invoke three presumptions concerning the use of proxies. All three caution against
their use.
First, in choosing between statutes drafted in terms of the relevant wrongdoing and those employing proxies, the burden of justification should be on the latter. As a matter of methodology, we begin by
identifying the wrongdoing that we seek to address. Having done so,
we confront the infinite number of potential proxies that might be
employed for the wrongdoing and require some justification for
choosing among them. Lacking any, we by default employ the wrongdoing itself to avoid arbitrariness.
Second, the use of proxies explicitly commits the law, at the level
of drafting, to underinclusion and overinclusion. When proxies are
used, the criminal law on its face, and in its correct operation, punishes some who do not deserve to be punished. Due to such phenomena as jury error, the criminal justice system will inevitably punish
those who do not deserve to be punished. Nevertheless, the government appears to commit itself to this result self-consciously by employing proxies. If those who do not deserve to be punished are to be,
it seems better that this occur as the result of inevitable failures of the
criminal justice system, rather than as the result of intentionally created aspects of it. We may say that the use of proxies creates a higher
degree of culpability (intentionally versus knowingly) for the punishment of those who do not deserve to be punished.
Third, although the primary function of the criminal law may be
to deter potential criminals or punish in accordance with desert, the
criminal law also serves an educational function. Society's most
strongly held values underlie the criminal law. Criminal statutes are
the most direct and public expression of these values.11 2 This educational function is undercut when the law uses proxies, instead of incorporating the wrongs that underlie the prohibition in the face of the
statute. The public will usually accept the law at face value because it
112

ING:

See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment,in DOiNG

ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSImIUTY

AND DESERV-

95, 98-104 (1970).
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is the face of the law that the public is obliged to obey. Hence proxies
are presumably disfavored. As relevant here, statutes drafted in terms
of secondary effects would appropriately convey to the public the
gravity of such harms. In contrast, bias crime statutes, as currently
formulated, send the message that acting because of certain reasons is
so improper as to be punishable. As argued in the previous section,
however, this is not the best moral theory. 113 Although the race or
other specified characteristic of a person generally should not be relevant to how a person is treated, acting on such a basis should not be
considered a form of wrongdoing. To maintain otherwise would be
detrimental to our respect for the autonomy and sanctity of thought.
Thus, the antidiscrimination message that bias crime statutes convey,
while a worthy message, is conveyed too powerfully. It overwhelms
other equally important social norms.
Defending bias crime statutes based on their secondary effects is
a popular approach because it avoids the more controversial moral
issues raised by bias crime statutes discussed in the previous section.
Nevertheless, the presumptive considerations discussed above cast
doubt on the merits of bias crime statutes as currently drafted. Thus,
it may be asked whether such approaches based on the alleged secondary consequences of bias crimes are anything more than rationalizations for more intuitive objections to bias crimes. Professor
Lawrence, for example, admits that "[t]he rhetoric surrounding the
enactment of bias crime law suggests that most supporters of such legislation espouse a thoroughly deontological [nonconsequentialist] justification for the enhanced punishment of racially motivated
violence. '114 These supporters would probably object to the secondary-harm theory that bias crimes are wrongful because they tend to
deeply offend their victims or members of the victim's community.
Rather, these supporters of bias crime statutes would contend that
bias crimes are deeply offensive to the victim and the victim's community because of some independently wrongful aspect. A justification
of bias crime statutes based on secondary harms would be strongest if,
contrary to the arguments of section III.B.1, a more forceful case
could be made for the independent wrongfulness of discrimination.

113 See supra section III.B.1.

114 See Lawrence, supra note 10, at 365 (citing 139 CONG. REQ S12176 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1993)
(statements of chief sponsor of federal bias crime statute)); see also Grannis, supranote 7, at 222
(1993) ("Penalty-enhancement statutes reflect a judgment by society that it is particularly morally egregious to assault someone on account of their race."); Redish, supra,note 58, at 29 ("On
a purely moral or emotional level, the concept of sentence enhancement for crimes motivated by
racial or religious hatred possesses substantial appeal to many.") (footnote omitted).
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C. Problems with Theories of Greater Culpability
Wrongdoing-based theories of bias crime statutes rely on questionable claims to others' thoughts or the contingencies of secondary
harms. Such theories, we may feel do not tell the full story of our
willingness to subject bias criminals to greater penalties. Culpabilitybased justifications for bias crime statutes offer an alternative approach to justifying bias crime statutes. We believe the murderer
should receive a harsher sentence than the drunk driver who kills not
because the murderer has caused more harm, but because of the murderer's greater culpability for the harm. 115 Likewise, we may be
tempted to say that bias criminals, even if they have not caused a distinctive harm by their acts, are more culpable for the harm they have
caused than other criminals. Bias criminals have acted based on particularly repugnant beliefs or values. This fact, it may be argued, leads
to an enhanced culpability justifying greater punishment.
This subpart of the Article considers culpability-based justifications of bias crime statutes and identifies their failings. Section 1 gives
some reasons why as a theoretical matter culpability-based justifications of bias crime statutes are plausible and attractive. Section 2 suggests that bias crime statutes may be understood as criminalizing
motivations concerning race and other specified characteristics, and
explicates the concept of motivation in terms of belief and desires.
Based on this understanding of motivation, sections 3 and 4 examine
two theories of how acting based on bias motivations might lead to
greater culpability for the wrongdoing at issue. These sections find
that although motivations may be relevant to. culpability in some
cases, bias motivations will generally not be relevant to culpability.
Hence, culpability-based justifications of bias crime statutes are
judged unsatisfactory.
1. The Appeal of Culpability-Based Justifications.-There are
two prima facie reasons for thinking that culpability-based justifications of bias crime statutes would be more successful than those based
on wrongdoing. First, thoughts, such as intentions and beliefs, are traditionally understood as bearing on a person's culpability for a wrongdoing. We usually identify the wrongdoing at issue by employing a
description of the act that excludes the actor's thoughts (beyond those
implicit in a movement being an action). Without reference to Jim's
thoughts, we may say that Jim moved his fist through the air until it
contacted and broke John's nose-a wrongdoing. Including different
subjective aspects of the act in our description, we may say that Jim, in
breaking John's nose, premeditatedly attacked John, or acted for his
own protection, or was stretching his cramped arm, or was acting to
115 For a discussion of the distinction between wrongdoing and culpability, see subpart II.B.
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fulfill a request of John's, or acquiesced to Joe's threat. These descriptions with implicit subjective components concerning thoughts, beliefs,
motives, and so on, are the ones relevant to assessing culpability.
They indicate whether the act was intentional, excusable, accidental,
or made under duress. Whether a person acts "because of" a specified
characteristic is, loosely speaking, a matter of the person's thoughts.
Accordingly, it is plausible to think that the thought-based "because
of' element of bias crime statutes is relevant to assessing culpability.
Second, placing bias on the culpability side of the wrongdoingculpability framework avoids the problems of wrongdoing-based justifications. With culpability-based justifications, bias may be understood as directly relevant to desert-rather than merely being a
proxy-without implying an interest in the thoughts of another. Thus,
116
the problem of thought-crimes does not arise. As discussed earlier,
while norms concerning wrongdoing are addressed to the actor, principles of evaluation relevant to culpability are addressed to those who
would judge the actor. For example, in order to comply with the law,
it is sufficient that Abe know the legal norm "Don't take property
without permission." A court would not find Abe criminally liable for
taking Bob's umbrella without permission if Abe merely did so carelessly. However, just as the insane do not need to know that they will
not be held liable, Abe need not be aware of the evaluation principle
in the criminal law that carelessly committing a wrongdoing is less culpable than intentionally committing a wrongdoing. 117 In general, by
telling courts to punish wrongdoings committed intentionally more
harshly than those committed recklessly, and telling courts not to punish at all wrongdoing committed while insane, the government is not
instructing citizens to engage in their wrongdoings recklessly rather
than intentionally, and ideally while insane. Thus, thoughts of one
type (reckless or insane) are not promoted over those of another type
116 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

117 Of course, in deciding whether he should employ care in trying to select his umbrella, Abe
might be interested in the degree to which he might be subject to criminal sanction if it is proven
that he carelessly selected Bob's umbrella. In this way, knowledge of legal principles of evaluation may be relevant to self-interested persons deciding whether to avoid wrongdoing recognized
by the criminal law. Nevertheless, the distinction between norms of conduct addressed to citizens and principles of evaluation addressed to courts is sound. The former concern wrongdoing
and must be known before citizens can comply with them. In contrast, principles of evaluation
concern culpability and do not need to be known by law-abiding citizens. Rather, these principles are only one set of a great many facts about the world that a self-interested citizen might
wish to know when choosing a course of conduct. Other relevant facts might be the likelihood of
capture, the ability of defense lawyers to win an acquittal, and the psychological guilt associated
with committing crimes. Unlike norms of conduct, principles of evaluation have no unique role
in maintaining social order. For a discussion of the implications for criminal law of the distinction between norms of conduct and principles of evaluation, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decisional
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625

(1984).
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(rational and deliberate). By making thoughts relevant to culpability,
the government is trying merely to punish persons fairly, not to assert
an interest in thoughts.
2. An Analysis of Motivation.-Culpability-based justifications
seem promising. In order to evaluate such justifications, however, a
reasonably precise understanding is needed of what type of thought
acting "because of" involves. Bias crime statutes do not define what
acting "because of" is. Nevertheless, it is natural to describe them as
criminalizing motivations because those who act "because of" race or
other specified characteristics may be said to be motivated by considerations of race or those specified characteristics. The relevance of
motivations to the criminal law, however, is controversial. In this section, I explicate the concept of motivation and identify a relatively
trivial way in which motivation is relevant in the criminal law.
Questions regarding the nature of motivations and whether they
should be relevant to the criminal law have generated copious commentary. According to one tradition, motivations are interlocking desire-belief pairs that cause actions. 18 This tradition is consistent with
the common usage of "motivation." For example, we may say that
Gladys's motivation in drinking the beverage was her desire to quench
her thirst and the belief that doing so would quench her thirst. In
general, a motivation for an action A will comprise the desire for a
result and the belief that the actor's engaging in A will be conducive to
the achievement of that result." 9 Furthermore, for an actor to perform an act A because of a motivation, not only must the actor have
the appropriate interlocking beliefs and desires to perform A, but A
must also be caused by those beliefs and desires. 120 For example, even
118 See JERoME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRUAINAL LAW 89-91 (2d ed. 1947);

MOORE, supranote 43, at 136-37; Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, [LX] J. PMLu
685, 685-86 (1963) (using the term "primary reason" rather than "motive"); Hurd, supra note 29,
at 170; Sistare, supra note 32, at 324 n.1 (citing other proponents of this view).
According to an alternative tradition, motivations are simply a species of intention. They
are identical with what might be called "ulterior" (or "further") intentions. See, eg., LAFAvE,
supranote 90, § 3.6(a) (1986); GLANsviLLE WILLTAMS, CRITNAL LAw. Tim GENERAL PART 4850 (2d ed. 1961); Grannis, supra note 7, at 190; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Crimes: What Do Haters
Deserve?, 11 Cnms. Jus. ETcs 20, 21 (Summer/Fall 1992); see supra Sistare, supra note 32, at
324 n.1 (1987) (citing sources). Those who hold this view typically take motivations to be intentions ulterior to those the criminal law is concerned with. By definition, motivations cannot lead
to greater culpability. See LAFAVE, supranote 90, at 228, 229; WILLIAMS, supra, at 49; Grannis,
supra note 7, at 190. This analysis of motivations has little to recommend it for the purpose of
investigating the justifiability of bias crime statutes. First, motivations are defined in a manner
that appears to decide the issue of their relevance in advance. Second, the position that bias
crime statutes criminalize a type of intention was considered early and rejected in subpart III.A
because it failed to yield a plausible justification for bias crime statutes.
119 See Alfred R. Mele, Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions, 48 PmIL. &

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs., 722, 722 (1988).
120 Davidson, supra note 118, at 691.
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if Gladys, in drinking the beverage, both desired to quench her thirst
and believed that drinking the beverage would quench her thirst, we
would not say she was motivated by these beliefs and desires if (1)
Gladys happened to be an actor who desired to follow the script calling for her to drink and believed drinking would follow the script, and
(2) but for these beliefs and desires concerning the script, she would
not have drunk the beverage. In this case, her motivation would have
been the beliefs and desires concerning the requirements of the script.
Motivations, defined in this manner, are distinct from intentions
in two respects. First, in contrast to our intentions, our beliefs and
desires are not a result of a direct act of will or free choice. When we
choose what acts to perform, we thereby establish our intentions.
Thus, although our intentions are not the immediate objects of our
choice, they are created by the willful act of choosing. In contrast,
beliefs and desires ordinarily cannot be created simply through an act
of will. A person may want to believe that 2+2=5, but outside of
Orwell's 1984,121 this is not within his power to bring about directly.
Likewise, a person may think it laudable to have certain desires, such
as the desire to work for world peace. If she lacks that desire, however, she cannot change this simply through an act of will.122
Second, in contrast to our motivations, our intentions may not be
in direct conflict. Desires and beliefs are usually developed independently. Thus, it is possible to have desires that are not simultaneously
satisfiable relative to sets of beliefs. In such cases, we say our motivations, like opposing forces, conflict. For example, where Harry has a
motivation to stay at home (the desire to watch Seinfeld and the belief
that it will be on TV) and a motivation to go out (the desire to see
friends and the belief they will be at the restaurant), Harry's motivations directly conflict. In contrast, intentions cannot be in direct con123
flict: Harry cannot both intend to stay at home and intend to go out.
121 See GEORGE ORwEm, 1984 at 211-15 (1949).

122 We may act in ways to influence the development of our beliefs and desires, see John J.
Jenkins, Motive and Intention, 15 Pi- Q. 155, 160 (1965), such as by going to church regularly
or reading up on a topic. Such a process, however, has an instrumental, rather than a direct,
effect on beliefs and desires. For instance, through a direct act of will I raise my hand; I do not
think in terms of contracting my arm muscle to cause my hand to raise. Although I may also
cause the elevator I am in to rise, I do not do this though a direct act of will, but only instrumentally through the movement of my hand. Likewise the influence I have on my beliefs and desires
through such activities as church-going is merely instrumental. See Michael Moore, Authority,
Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 827, 878-83 (1989).

123 It is possible for one to have incompatible intentions (i.e., intentions to achieve goals that
exclude each other's realization) and not realize they are incompatible. For example, one might
intend to become President and intend to live a relaxed, private life without knowing that the
position will entail a busy life with little privacy. In this case, however, the intentions do not
actually conflict (in the sense that motivations might) because their incompatibility is not appreciated. Appreciating the incompatibility of one's motivations does not preclude conflict, but

1066

91:1015 (1997)

Foundationsof Bias Crime Statutes

The foregoing observations implicitly follow from a well-known
picture of the process of practical reasoning. 124 Deciding what to do is
very roughly a matter of weighing one's desires against the background of one's beliefs and determining which actions will lead to the
greatest satisfaction of these intrinsic desires. Desires discounted by
our belief that they will be fulfilled are the weights that are put on
each side of the scale when determining what our intentions shall be.
Intentions, in turn, are the outcome of the weighing. They are formed
based on motivations and are the immediate causes of actions. Thus,
there is a close connection, but not identity, between motivations and
intentions. Although a motivation to do A may result in an intention
to do A, it need not. The motivation may be suppressed or
overridden. 125
The preceding analysis of motivation yields an uninteresting answer to the general question whether motivations are relevant to criminal law. One trivial way that motivations might be relevant is by
giving rise to intentions that support culpability. Because intending a
wrongdoing undeniably creates culpability for the wrongdoing, the
motivations that make the wrongdoing intentional also create culpability, albeit indirectly. For example, if Hal starts the fire based on his
desire to bum down the building, then Hal has burned down the
building intentionally and is culpable for it. Indeed, based on this connection between motivations and intentions, criminal offenses could
be formulated in terms of motivations rather than intentions. Instead
of defining murder as the intentional causing of the death of another
person, murder could be defined as causing the death of another person based on the motivation that the other person die. Thus there is
nothing per se improper about "criminalizing.motivations."
tPhe above analysis does not answer the question whether bias
crimes involve greater culpability for a wrongdoing than similar
crimes that do not involve bias. Motivations have been shown relevant insofar as they give rise to intentions, and intentions are clearly
relevant to culpability. All crimes, however, involve intentional action
and many crimes involve intended wrongdoings. For a culpabilitybased theory of bias crime statutes to succeed, it must show how the
perpetrator of even a crime of intentional wrongdoing, such as assault,
can be more culpable when he acts from bias than he would be otherwise. A theory of bias-enhanced culpability is needed.

engenders it. In contrast, when one appreciates the inconsistency of one's intentions, one brackets the intentions until the conflict is resolved in the underlying motivations.
124 See MICHAEL S. MooRE, Acr AND CRinm: TnE PmLosoPHY OF AcnoN AND ITs IMPLICATIONS FOR T-M CRDIMNAL LAW 144 (1993).

125 Id.
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3. Bias Motivations Do Not Produce ParticularlyFirm Intentions.-One way that motivations might be thought to enhance culpability for an intentional wrongdoing is through the quality of
intentions that they can give rise to. Although the intentional character of an act is generally not regarded as a matter of degree (an act is
either intended or not), the weighing process leading to the formation
of the intention may either firmly or weakly recommend the act. This
recommendation is based on whether the desires and beliefs supporting the action and the desires and beliefs counseling against the action
are relatively balanced or one-sided. A person thus may adopt a
course of action either enthusiastically or half-heartedly based on his
motivations. We might be tempted to hold a person more culpable for
a wrongdoing where the person has intentionally and enthusiastically
committed the wrongdoing than where the person has intentionally
but half-heartedly committed the wrongdoing. Similarly, a person's
weighing of beliefs and desires may either be hasty or well-considered
depending on the thoroughness with which the person's beliefs and
desires are considered, relative to the nature of the beliefs and desires
at issue. Complicated reasons and repressed desires may require
greater consideration. We can imagine holding a person more culpable where the weighing was well-considered than where it was tentative. Indeed, the heightened culpability assigned in many jurisdictions
to premeditated murder may reflect the judgment that intentions that
are well-considered render a person more culpable. 126
There seems to be no reason to believe that bias motivations give
rise to firmly held intentions of the type discussed above. As with any
crime, bias crimes are committed by a range of persons. Some will be

firmly committed to engaging in the underlying crime because of the
strength of their bias motivation; the threat of criminal sanctions will
not pose a significant counterweight to action. Other bias criminals
will be at the margin; their bias motivation will barely overcome their
fear of sanctions. Some motivations for crime likely only exist with
great intensity, for example, the need to obtain narcotics. Other motivations, such as greed, personal animosity, lust, and general hostility,
are matters of degree, likely occurring across the population in relatively smooth, bell-shaped distributions. Bias, akin to personal animus and general hostility, likely falls within this second category of
motivations. Thus, one would expect a relatively bell-shaped distribu126 Our inclination to recognize culpability-increasing and culpability-mitigating forms of intentionality may be based on the desire for punishment to fit the criminal as well as the crime.

We may have doubts about the appropriateness of sending a person to prison for many years on
the basis of an out-of-character, spur-of-the-moment, regretted, but nonetheless intentional, act.
It is possible that an intentional act will not be representative of the full personality of the criminal; nevertheless, this full personality will bear the weight of the punishment. There are, as
always, possible utilitarian justifications for practices such as punishing premeditated murders
more harshly. These possible justifications, however, do not exclude culpability-based ones.
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tion of marginally, moderately, and strongly committed bias
criminals. There is no reason to expect that the latter would
predominate in bias crimes more than strongly committed criminals
predominate in other types of crimes. 127
Likewise, there is no reason to believe that bias criminals, by virtue of acting based on the desire to harm a victim of a certain type, act
on particularly well-considered desires and beliefs. Again, as with
other crimes, there is a range of scenarios in which the intention to
commit a bias crime is formed. Undoubtedly, there are instances
where bias attacks are the product of sinister planning and simmering
hatred. Yet on many occasions, racial or other forms of intolerance
may flare and erupt into violence. Bias itself is a deep-rooted motivation. But the criminal intentions that it gives rise to are qualitatively
as varied as the intentions to commit nonbias crimes. Thus, bias does
not produce intentions with qualitative characteristics that justify enhanced penalties on culpability grounds.
4. Bias Motivations Do Not Particularly Connect to Wrongdoing.-This section considers a distinct theory of how a person's motivation for an intentional wrongdoing can affect her culpability for the
wrongdoing. The first subsection isolates an example of motivations
mattering apart from the intentions they give rise to; the second develops a theory of why these motivations matter; the third subsection
applies the theory to bias crimes and concludes that even under this
theory they do not involve greater culpability than nonbias crimes; the
fourth subsection responds to some possible counter-arguments.
a. Where motivations increase culpability.-One difficulty
in examining the significance of motivations is based on their close
association with intentions. Contrary to claims of commentators, 128
127 For this reason, justifications of bias crime statutes that are based on considerations of
general deterrence, see, e.g, Kevin N. Ainsworth, Targeting Conduct: A ConstitutionalMethod of
Penalizing Hate, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 669, 685 (1993); Lawrence, supra note 10, at 377, must
be viewed skeptically. Although those who commit crimes because of bias by definition have
different motivations from those who commit crimes for other reasons, there is no ground for
believing that the existence of this reason justifies "plac[ing] a heavier weight on the deterrence
side of the scale." Id. There is also no reason to believe that the average biased criminal is more
committed to his crime than other criminals are to theirs. Bias is simply a different-not necessarily an additional or more powerful-motivation for crime.
With respect to specific deterrence, Professor Tribe offers that "a race-based assault motivated by racial bigotry might similarly be thought to be more indicative of further dangerousness
than is an otherwise identical assault which is not so motivated." Tribe, supra note 7, at 14.
Tribe, however, advances few grounds for accepting this hypothesis of greater future dangerousness and appears primarily to raise it for the sake of argument.
128 See Douglas N. Husak, Motive and CriminalLiability,CIum. Jusr. ETmcs, Winter/Spring
1989, at 3,4, 10-11 (providing other hypotheticals-structurally similar to the mercy killing hypothetical-which raises the issue regarding the requirement of justificatory intent to revoke an
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the basic example provided below does not show the relevance of
motivations in any way beyond the intentions they give rise to. A
further elaboration, however, provides a true example of motivations
mattering.
The basic example concerns mercy killing. Consider two cases, 1
and 2, in which a nephew kills his uncle who is terminally ill, is suffering great pain, and wishes to die. In each case, the uncle's will provides a substantial inheritance for the nephew. In case 1, Nephew-1 is
motivated solely by the desire to end Uncle's great suffering. In case
2, Nephew-2 is motivated solely by the desire for a hastened possession of his inheritance. Only Nephew-i, it is felt, may be entitled to
have his punishment mitigated.
The mercy killing example merely shows the relevance of motivations in defining the scope of the intended consequences that will be
relevant to assessing desert. The difference between the nephews is
that Nephew-1 intended to kill Uncle and to alleviate Uncle's suffering and only knew that his receipt of his inheritance would be hastened. In contrast, Nephew-2, intending to kill Uncle and hasten the
receipt of his inheritance, merely knew that he would alleviate Uncle's
suffering. Alleviating Uncle's pain is a "rightdoing,"' 129 that somewhat
offsets the wrong of the killing. Thus, the doing Nephew-1 intendedkilling and alleviating-was less wrong than the doing Nephew-2 intended-killing and collecting. 130 Motivation is only relevant because
it defines the intentions relevant to determining desert.' 3 '
A further hypothetical, however, illustrates how motivations may
be relevant, over and above the consequences they make intended. In
case 3, Uncle's will provides that in the event Uncle becomes termiexcuse or justification defense); Murphy, supranote 118, at 20-22; Sistare, supranote 32, at 31214.

129 "Rightdoing" is the opposite of wrongdoing. Rightdoing is roughly causing, or making
more proximate, some benefit to society.
130 Professor Alexander fails to take this point into account when he asserts, "Increasing punishment for, say, assault because it is committed with a bigoted motive is no more problematic
than decreasing the punishment for homicide because it is committed out of mercy," Larry Alexander, The ADL Hate Crime Statute and the FirstAmendment, Crm. JusT. ETmcs, Summer/Fall

1992,49,49. When a homicide is committed out of mercy, the perpetrator's intent is to cause an
objective benefit-the ending of pain-not usually associated with homicide. When an assault is
committed from bigoted motive, the perpetrator is not necessarily intending to cause a harm
beyond that normally associated with assault.
131 This perspective on motivations suggests no path for justifying bias crime statutes, contrary to the views of some commentators. A perpetrator of a bias mugging may intend that his
victim be white and know that his victim is wealthy. In contrast, a mugger not acting from bias,
intends that his victim be wealthy, but merely knows that his victim is white. This distinction,
however, does not make a difference on the assumption, examined earlier, see supranotes 45-46
and accompanying text, that the victimization of a white is no greater a wrongdoing than the
victimization of a person of another classification, such as a wealthy person. Although what the
perpetrators intend and know of are different, what they intend is equally wrongful, as is what
they know they will do.
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nally ill and in pain, whoever shall terminate his life and thereby alleviate his suffering shall receive an inheritance bonus. 132 Nephew-3
kills Uncle intending to alleviate his suffering solely in order to take
advantage of this provision of the will. We are not inclined to mitigate
Nephew-3's punishment, as we are Nephew-l's. Nephew-1 is the
mercy killer; Nephew-3 is just a greedy person taking advantage of a
convenient will provision. There seems no morally relevant difference
between him and Nephew-2 who also was a greedy person who took
advantage of a convenient will provision. Like Nephew-2, but unlike
Nephew-i, Nephew-3 deserves full punishment.
The difference between Nephew-1 and Nephew-3 cannot be explained by appeal to intended wrongdoings and rightdoings. Nephew3, as Nephew-i, kills Uncle intending to alleviate his suffering (a prerequisite for collecting the inheritance bonus). Although Nephew-3
also intends, unlike Nephew-i, to collect an inheritance bonus, there is
no wrongdoing per se involved in receiving the bonus because under
the terms of the will, Nephew-3 is entitled to it.133 Thus, the net
wrongfulness of Nephew-l's and Nephew-3's intended wrongdoings
and rightdoings (killing and alleviating pain) are equal. The sole differences between Nephew-1 and Nephew-3 are in their underlying
motivations.
b. Why motivations increase culpability.-The above hypotheticals suggest that motivations matter because intrinsically desiring a wrongdoing or rightdoing matters. Looking to the belief-desire
pairs that motivated their actions, we may say that alleviating pain was
an intrinsic desire for Nephew-i; for Nephew-3 it was only an instrumental desire. Nephew-i, in contrast to Nephew-3, is believed to deserve more credit for alleviating Uncle's suffering because he
intrinsically desired to end the suffering, rather than desiring it as a
means to obtaining an inheritance bonus. 34
132 Assume that this provision would be enforceable in the relevant jurisdiction. Mercy killings would, however, still be considered murders. The jurisdiction just lacks a doctrine of voidas-contrary-to-public-policy.
133 Notice that there is also no rightdoing involved in receiving the bonus. Although
Nephew-3 benefits from the bonus, the benefit to the wrongdoer is generally not taken into
account in assessing punishment, unless the benefit is the avoidance of evil. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.02 (Choice of Evils) (1962).
134 The notion of intrinsic wants may appear suspect or inherently slippery. Nevertheless, I
believe it is serviceable. First, it is clear that we have intrinsic wants. If we did not, then there
could be no wants at all because extrinsic wants are dependent on there being intrinsic wants
that can be advanced. The real question is whether intrinsic wants can be identified in a nonarbitrary way. Cannot any desire be redescribed so that it is only instrumental relative to a more
ulterior desire? For example, the desire for money is really only the desire for what money can
buy, which is really only the desire for the use of what money can buy, which is really only the
desire for the pleasure of what the use .... ad infinitum. I view intrinsic desires as contingent
psychological features that may vary from person to person or may change over time. Intrinsic
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The moral relevance of the distinction between intrinsically desiring a result and merely intending a result (i.e., instrumentally desiring
the result) can be illuminated by comparing it with the moral distinction between knowingness and intentionality. 135 This latter distinction
has been most fully investigated in the context of the Doctrine of
Double Effect (DDE). The DDE is an ethical doctrine usually traced
to Thomas Aquinas. 136 As the doctrine is classically understood, four
conditions must be met in order to justify an act foreseeably resulting
in harm to another: (1) the intended final end must be good; (2) the
intended means to it must be morally acceptable; (3) the foreseen
harm must not itself be intended; and (4) the good end must be proportional to the foreseen harm. 137 For our purposes the critical condidesires have no essential objects. For instance, some people may want money for its own sake,
such as to become millionaires, while others may want it for the pleasure it may bring. See
FENBERO,, supra note 53, at 43 ("[Very few of us have interests in contented states of mind or in
avoiding disappointments as such. Rather, our interests and desires both are typically aimed at
external things, not internal states."). Furthermore, it is common for people to establish subjectively intermediate goals as ultimate ones in order to better focus their energies. Becoming
President is raised to an intrinsic desire so that doubts about its ultimate desirability will not
interfere with the long haul of campaigning. The content of an individual's intrinsic beliefs can
usually be explored through counterfactuals. For example, would she have sacrificed her marriage for her career in politics if she had known that she would get no pleasure from her fame?
The answer to such questions will generally be no less determinate than the answer to other
counterfactuals concerning human behavior.
The notion of intrinsic desire is no more problematic than the notion of intention. Precise
identification of intention may create theoretical problems. Did Jim start the fire with the intent
to destroy the building, or may he raise the defense to the charge of arson that he (1) merely
intended that the insurance company believe the building had been destroyed, and (2) knew that
the building would be destroyed? Cf. Due, supranote 30, at 89-92 (1990) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing knowledge from intentions). In some cases, we may neither want nor be
able to draw fine distinctions between closely related intentions and closely related intrinsic
desires. Nevertheless, the concepts are sound enough to bear a reasonable amount of moral
weight.
135 The relationship between knowing a result will occur, intending the result, and intrinsically
desiring the result is illustrated by the diagram below. Three results are known to follow from
act A: R1, R2 and R3. Assume that R3 is intrinsically desired. Therefore, R2 will be intended.
Because Ri is neither intrinsically desired, nor part of a causal chain leading to an intrinsically
desired result, R1 is merely a known result.
R2
>R 3
A
> R,
136 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, Q. 64, art. 7 (Marcus Lefebure ed.,

Blackfriars 1975).
137 See Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PIL. & Pun. Asp., 334, 334 n.3 (1989). Sometimes the conditions are advanced as being
necessary and sometimes as being both necessary and sufficient. Compare, Nancy Davis, The
Doctrine of Double Effect Problemsof Interpretation,65 PAc. PHIL Q. 107, 121 n.8 (1984), with
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tion is (3). A typical example illustrating the operation of this
condition is that it is morally permissible to bomb a munitions factory
to hasten the end of a war even if it is foreseen that civilians will inevitably be killed by errant bombs. It is not, however, morally permissible to drop bombs on civilians in order to hasten the end of the war by
breaking the morale of the enemy.138 According to DDE, the difference is that in the case of the munitions bombing, the civilian deaths
are merely foreseen, while in the morale bombing the deaths are intended. Thus, DDE draws a distinction between knowing a result will
occur and intending that the result will occur.
DDE is controversial. Much of the discussion of DDE has been
bottom-up, that is, assessing the doctrine's ability to account for our
intuitions about a range of scenarios involving intended or known
harms. The so-called "Trolley Problem" and its innumerable variants
are examples of scenarios intended to elicit these intuitions and reveal
their complexity. 139 Principles other than DDE have been argued to
better explain this moral data. 140 Thus, defenders of DDE have also
sought to justify it top-down, that is, based on more general principles
or considerations. Thomas Nagel has attempted to explain the peculiar offensiveness of intending, as opposed to merely foreseeing, evil
along the following lines:
[T]o aim at evil, even as a means, is to have one's action guided by evil.
One must be prepared to adjust it to insure the production of evil ....
But the essence of evil is that it should repel us.... So when we aim at
evil we are swimming head-on against the normative current.
... [T]here is also something to be said about the point of view of the
victim.
... The victim feels outrage when he is deliberately harmed even
for the greater good of others, not simply because of the quantity of the
harm4but because of the assault on his value of my actions guided by his

evil.' '

Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Towards Understandingthe Principleof Double Effect, 90 ETmcas 527, 528
(1980).
138 For other typical examples, see Gerald Dworkin, Intention, Foreseeability,and Responsibility, in RESPONSmmrY, CHARACTER AND Trm EMOTIONS 338, 339 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,

1987).
139 The "trolley problem" generically describes situations in which certain conduct (e.g.,
bombing) with the same ultimate objective (e.g., ending the war) is accepted in some contexts
(e.g., bombing munitions factories) and not others (e.g., bombing civilians). See Eric Rakowski,
Taking and Saving Lives, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1063, 1064 n.1 (1993) (collecting literature on the
trolley problem); see also Simons, supra note 49, at 554 n.276 (generally collecting literature on
DDE).
140 See, eg., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, in
VmTuns Am Vicns AND OTHER EssAys IN MoRAL PHILOSoPHY 19-32 (1978) (advancing distinction between positive and negative duties as better accounting for our intuitions).
141 THoMAs NAGEL, THE VIEw FROM NowHERE, 181-84 (1986).
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Shelly Kagan, reviewing possible justifications for the distinction between intending and foreseeing evil, has distinguished between "the
thought.., that the agent is aiming at evil [and] the idea.., that such
an agent uses the person whose harm he intends." 142 Likewise, Warren Quinn has written, "What seems specifically amiss in relations of
[intending harm] is the particular way in which victims enter into an
agent's strategic thinking.... He sees them as material to be strategically shaped or framed by his agency."' 143 Charles Fried discusses the
greater evil associated with intentional wrongs in terms of "mak[ing]
[the] harm a part of our projects," 44 as opposed to a mere sideeffect. 145
To the extent these explanations of the moral distinction between
intended and merely foreseen results have force,14 they apply equally
to the distinction between intrinsically desired and merely intended
results. When a person intrinsically desires a wrongdoing, not only is
evil a guide marker for the person (as it would be for a person who
merely intended the evil as a means to some other end), it is actually
her target. Similarly, the wrong to the victim is not merely a contingent means to the wrongdoer's end, but the wrong is the essence of
the wrongdoer's end. Likewise, the victim is not merely a contingent
part of the wrongdoer's project, but an essential part. In short, where
a person is motivated by an intrinsic desire to bring about the harm
underlying the wrongdoing, the person most identifies with and becomes maximally responsible for that wrongdoing.
I do not claim that intrinsically desiring a result is a condition that
substantially increases culpability over merely intending a result. Indeed, the Model Penal Code only irregularly assigns a higher penalty
level to crimes of intentional wrongs than to crimes of knowing
wrongs. 147 Nevertheless, because of the general consensus that inten142 SHELLEY KAGAN, THE LImrs OF MoRALnrY 166 (1989).-

143 Quinn, supra note 137, at 348 (footnote omitted).
144 CARLEs FRiED, RIG-rr AND WRONG 29 (1978) (footnote omitted).
145 Although these writers do not speak specifically in terms of culpability or wrongdoing, it is
reasonable to construe them as attributing to the actor greater culpability for a given wrongdoing. Nagel, for example, states that "it is no worse for the victim to be killed or injured deliberately than... as an unavoidable side effect." NAGEL, supra note 141, 178 (1986). He,.agreeing
with Thomas Scanlon, observes that a rescuer would have no reason to try to save the potential
murder victim rather than the potential victim of a merely foreseen killing. Id. 'But cf. Dworkin,
supranote 138, at 346 (claiming DDE goes to act evaluation, not agent evaluation, but denying a
sharp distinction between the two).
146 See DuFF,supra note 30, at 109-10 (asserting that on a consequentialist view, distinction
between knowingness and intentionality would not matter); Dworkin, supra note 138, at 348-50
(questioning persuasiveness of these accounts); Hart, supra note 34, at 122-25 (questioning coherence of distinction between knowingly and intentionally caused results). See generally
Moore, supra note 30, at 247 (noting position of various philosophers).
147 Among those offenses in which a distinction is drawn are: kidnaping, compare MODEL
PENAL CODE § 212.1 (establishing first degree felony for unlawfully confining another person for
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tional wrongdoing is more culpable than knowing wrongdoing, and
because of the structural similarity of the knowing/intending and intending/intrinsically-desiring distinctions, I believe it is reasonable to
understand motivations as increasing culpability for a wrongdoing
over that associated with merely intending the wrongdoing when the
motivation includes the intrinsic desire for the wrongdoing. Thus, we
have a plausible theory of the theoretical relevance of motivations to
the criminal law. 148
c. Intrinsic desire and bias.-Although, as discussed above,
motivations may increase culpability, it is difficult to justify bias crime
statutes, even narrowly construed, on these grounds.
When narrowly interpreted, bias crime statutes require the presence of a particular type of intrinsic desire. Professor Lawrence has
distinguished between a racial animus model and a discriminatory selection model of bias crimes. 149 As its name implies, under the racial
animus model, bias crimes are crimes in which racial animus or hostility toward the victim's group is a substantial factor motivating the underlying crime. Although racial animus' 50 comes in many shades, it is
roughly the desire that ill befall those of the target race or that those
of the target race be absent from the racist's sphere of interest. Racial
animus should be described as an intrinsic desire (as opposed to an
instrumental desire) because an individual who acts from racial anithe purpose, inter alia, of interfering with governmental function) with § 212.2 (establishing third
degree felony for knowingly restraining another unlawfully); § 215.5 (criminal coercion); § 213.5
(indecent exposure); § 220.1 (arson). Among those offenses in which a distinction is not drawn
are: § 210.2 (murder); § 211.0 (assault); § 211.3 (making terrorist threats); § 2202 (causing or
risking a catastrophe). There is likely no essential distinction between those crimes where intent
makes a difference in penalty and those where it does not. In all cases, the drafters of the Model
Penal Code may have believed that acting intentionally is worse, but because of the limited
number of penalty grades, only sometimes did the increase in desert justify an increase in penalty grade.
148 Some have argued that it cannot be wrong to act upon certain motivations because wrongfulness implies choice (under the principle of "ought implies can"), and we cannot choose our
motivations. See DuFF supra note 30, at 154-55; Hurd, supra note 30, at 169-70; Moore, supra
note 124, at 878-82. whether these arguments are sound, however, is not at issue here. It may
be relevant to desert whether a wrongdoing-related factor, such as the vulnerability of the victim, was chosen. It is not, however, relevant to desert whether a culpability-related factor was
chosen. A factor over which an actor has no control may properly be relevant to the actor's
culpability for a wrongdoing. For example, criminals do not choose to be sane or insane, but
sanity bears critically on their culpability. Likewise, to be culpable for an intended wrongdoing,
a person need not choose to intend the wrongdoing (whatever that might mean). Principles of
culpability are not norms to be followed if one "can," but principles for assessing desert based
upon the violation of a norm. Thus, it is irrelevant for culpability that motivations might not be
chosen.
149 See Lawrence, supra note 10, at 326-42.
150 There is no general term for all the analogues to racial animus with respect to the various
characteristics specified in bias crime statutes. Accordingly, in this part of my discussion, I shall
employ racial animus as a representative instance of other analogous motivations.
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mus would be gratified if no further consequences ensued beyond the
harm to or removal of the targeted group. Crimes of racial animus are
clearly within the scope of bias crime statutes.
Under the discriminatory selection model, racial animus is not required. All that is required is that the victim's race play some role in
the decision to commit the crime against the victim.15 1 For example,
Mike is a mugger who mugs Blacks simply because he believes that
the police are less likely to vigorously investigate muggings of Blacks.
Mike feels no animus towards Blacks, but Mike's belief concerning
Blacks has played a role in the reasoning that led to his intention to
assault Blacks. It is less clear whether assaults without racial animus
are also within the scope of the majority of bias crime statutes that
employ the "because of" formulation. 152 Discriminatory selection (in
the absence of racial animus) will require a belief concerning race
(such as that the police will not vigorously investigate the muggings of
Blacks). Thus, depending on the interpretation a bias crime statute
receives, the specified characteristic will be required to enter into the
perpetrator's reasoning at the level of intrinsic desire or merely belief.
Clearly there is no reason to believe that bias crimes involving
mere discriminatory selection will be crimes where wrongdoing is intrinsically desired. Muggers such as Mike, for example, generally have
no intrinsic desire that their victims suffer a loss; they merely wish to
gain and take from others as a means to that intrinsically desired end.
Moreover, even if construed to require racial animus, bias crimes
would not always involve heightened culpability because the intrinsic
desire involved is not of the right sort. All acts, hence all crimes, are
ultimately motivated by some intrinsic desire. Not all crimes, however, involve increased culpability based on intrinsic desires. As discussed above, the type of intrinsic desire that increases culpability is
the intrinsic desire to engage in wrongdoing. Some perpetrators of
bias crimes undoubtedly act because of the intrinsic desire to harm a
member of a particular race. 153 Some perpetrators who act from racial animus, however, desire to harm their victims for instrumental
reasons. Consider a resident of an all-white neighborhood who
throws a brick through the window of the newly arrived Black family
to cause the family to leave the neighborhood. The brick thrower
151 See Lawrence, supra note 10, at 333-34.

See i& at 339-40 ("Because of bias crime statues-either in the simple form or with the
additional element of maliciousness-evade easy classification as either racial animus or discriminatory selection laws.... Moreover, few of these laws have received definitive judicial construction."). But cf.Tribe, supra note 7, at 8 ("[I]t is by no means a requirement of hate crime laws
that the defendant be bigoted or act upon his or her bigotry.").
153 Although he employs a different chain of reasoning and only endorses the conclusion
tentatively, Professor Murphy appears to reach a similar substantive conclusion concerning the
justification for punishing some bias crimes more than some crimes not motivated by the intrinsic desire for wrongdoing. See Murphy, supra note 81, at 296 n.37, 297.
152
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feels animus towards Blacks: he genuinely dislikes them and does not
want to associate with them. Although the brick thrower dislikes
Blacks, he might not dislike them enough to intrinsically desire to
harm the new family. He simply wants them to live elsewhere (a morally neutral end), and if he could accomplish the result in a way not
involving wrongdoing (a payment), he would do so. Thus, even bias
crimes based on racial animus do not necessarily involve an intrinsic
desire for wrongdoing.
Furthermore, to the extent that bias crimes involve heightened
culpability based on intrinsic desires, they do not appear to warrant
the enhanced penalties that bias crime statutes establish. Although a
racist might commit a bias crime based on the intrinsic desire to harm
his victim, so might others. Many crimes are based on personally directed hate and hostility. Persons who commit such crimes generally
intrinsically desire the harm they have caused. Perpetrators of bias
crimes will act no more culpably than such persons. The standard regimes of penal provisions establish penalty ranges that are considered
sufficiently harsh to punish the common criminal acting from intrinsic
desires. Judges are believed to be competent to impose the appropriate sentence on the common criminal acting from intrinsic desires.
Because the standard regime of penal provisions can accommodate
intrinsically desired crimes in general, there appears to be no need for
statutes establishing enhanced penalties for criminals acting on biasrelated intrinsic desires in particular. In sum, the problem with attempting to justify bias crime statutes on a theory of greater culpability is that to the extent that greater punishments are warranted in
cases of racial animus, it is because of the "animus," not the "racial."
d. Untangling bias and culpability.-The preceding discussion helps bring into focus the difficulty of building a theory of greater
culpability based on bias. When examined closely, bias appears unlike
factors relevant to culpability. Intent and awareness of consequences
are paradigm examples of culpability-determining factors. Closely associated factors, perhaps expressed at a higher level of abstractness,
include strength of commitment, appreciation of results, and degree of
free agency. Concepts like "race" and "religion" have no unique position among these factors. Specifically, acting from bias does not seem
to connect one to a wrong in the way these other factors can. Consider, for example, a fire that destroys another's property. The following are at least candidates for establishing a connection between the
fire and the actor: hoping that such a fire might occur, agreeing to
join a plot to start such a fire, becoming sexually aroused by the fire,
or ignoring the risk inherent in the fire. These connections suggest
that the actor might be held culpable for the fire. The same could be
said if "explosion" or "robbery" were substituted for "fire." In these
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examples, the terms "the fire," "explosion," and "robbery" are not
doing any general connecting work. The concepts of hoping, etc., are
the general concepts connecting the actor to the wrongdoing. In contrast, if an actor has set a fire "because of race," there is no additional
connection between the setting of the fire and the actor, compared to
an actor who has set the fire for another reason.
In response to the above argument, it may be contended that if
the wrongdoing is described not as "causing a fire" but as "the burning of an Asian person's store," then acting because of the store's being owned by an Asian person appears to connect the actor to the
wrongdoing; the motivation matches or corresponds to the wrong.
But such an argument assumes that the race of the owner of the store
is relevant to wrongfulness because if it were not, the racial motivation would not connect the actor to a wrong, but merely to a morally
irrelevant aspect of the fire. The race of the owner, however, is not
directly relevant to the wrongfulness of the act. 154 Stealing from a Jew
is as wrong as stealing from a Gentile. As discussed earlier, 155 such
factors as race and religion do not increase or decrease one's rights or
importance. In sum, we may say that because stealing from a person
of type X is not a particularly wrongful theft, the motivation to steal
for a person of type X cannot be a particularly culpable motivation. 156
An alternative response is simply that the notion of culpability
that I have been relying on is too narrow. Even if assaulting a person
because of race does not connect the actor to the assault more closely,
the actor is still more culpable for it. Some vague notion of "connection" to the wrong is not the beginning and end of culpability. Rather,
it may be contended, the presence of, reliance on, and manifestation
of an immoral view is the basis of culpability. When the view is particularly morally abhorrent, such as in the case of racism and other forms
of bigotry, the culpability is increased proportionately. 157
Even on this wider view of culpability, it is unclear how bias in
particular increases culpability. The moral significance of racism, as a
154 The significance of the indirect relevance, or correlation, of race and wrongfulness is discussed supra in subpart III.A.

155 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
156 See Hurd, supra note 30, at 169 ("The bottom line is that any non-question begging attempt to specify the motivations upon which one can and cannot act will inevitably appeal to a
theory of right action ....
");
Moore, supra note 35, at 320 ("Between wrongdoing and culpability, the conceptually primary notion is thus wrongdoing, for it is the content of our norms of
obligations, which norms define wrongdoing, that tell us what it is culpable to believe or
intend.").
157 Professor Lawrence, for example, endorses the position "that the culpability associated
with bias crimes makes these crimes more serious than parallel crimes." Lawrence, supra note
10, at 365. Lawrence suggests that a bias criminal is particularly culpable because his motivation
"violates the equality principle, one of the most deeply held tenets in our legal system and our
culture." Id.
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particular instance of an ideology violating the equality principle, is
unclear. Racism is a mistaken view insofar as it holds that the worth
of individuals-a profoundly important moral matter-is tied to their
race. Yet any form of egoism in which the actor believes that he is
more entitled to property, respect, or consideration than others is similarly mistaken about the worth of others. Likewise, where an actor
has come to believe that a particular individual has some unique feature or has engaged in some unique activity that would permit her to
be harmed, and that belief is false, the belief is also a profound moral
mistake, even though it happens to apply to only one person. Along
the continuum between general disrespect for all others and specific
disrespect for a single individual, racism and other forms of groupbased intolerance occupy no position making them uniquely abhorrent. Indeed, because anti-Asian intolerance seems as bad as antiAleutian intolerance, the size, as much as the specificity, of the group
despised seems irrelevant. All criminal acts,.to the extent that they
are founded on conscious, articulable views about the relative rights
of
others, may be said to be based on equally abhorrent views.' 58
We are led to probe more deeply our intuitions concerning bias.
One explanation of the strong sense of condemnation that might be
felt toward bias criminals is based on epistemic considerations. Engaging in wrongdoing from racial animus (or analogous motivations)
is virtually inconsistent with having an excuse for the wrongdoing. 159
Thus, upon learning that a crime was committed from racial animus,
we may feel increased confidence that the actor's prime facie culpability will not have to be downwardly reassessed based on some as-yetundisclosed exculpatory factor. An increase in confidence of this
type, however, is not the same as an increase in the actor's objective
culpability. A criminal who acts on racial animus would still be no
more culpable than one who acted on personal animus.
Another explanation of our abhorrence of bias may be the natural tendency to conflate the view with its contingent consequences. In
every instance of bias, we see partially reflected the slavery, genocide,
and countless other wrongful acts that, as a matter of our contingent
history, have been done in its name. Furthermore, there is little, if
anything, good to associate with bias. 160 In contrast, other sources of
crime, such as greed, when not taken to excess, may have socially useful aspects. Furthermore, many of the other diverse reasons for harming others-jealousy, short-temperedness, short-sightedness,
rebelliousness, peer-pressure, self-destructiveness-blend into the
158 See Murphy, supra note 118, at 23 ("[A]lmost all assaults, whether racial or not, involve
motives of humiliation and are thus evil to the same degree.").
159 An excuse based on insanity might still be available.
160 Perhaps some degree of increased cultural awareness and solidarity may be associated
with small amounts of bias.
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background environment of the human condition. Bias thus appears
to unite a category of crimes into a particularly salient class, the paradigm members of which are among the greatest evils in human history. In punishing persons, we should ideally assess their punishment
based on the harms they caused, intended or risked. We should not
punish them based on the harms caused by other acts that may be
similar, but not in a morally relevant way. For example, an assault
should not be punished more harshly because it happened to be committed with a weapon used in a previous assault. Likewise, a GermanAmerican should not be punished more for a murder simply because
Germans were responsible for the Holocaust. Based on similar reasoning, we should avoid the temptation to punish more harshly those
who act based on anti-Semitism simply because anti-Semitism produced the Holocaust.
The conclusion that bias itself does not increase culpability does
not leave us silent and still before it. Punishment is only one form of
response to that which we view as morally repugnant. An assault
based on race arguably reveals a particularly corrupt character. Yet it
is generally conceded that bad character itself is not a ground for
criminal liability.161 For example, we do not punish the mere disposition to dishonesty. Nevertheless, bad character is grounds for criticism, and so we may criticize bigots, where criticism does not rise to
the level of intentionally inflicting suffering. Likewise, bigots may be
shunned for the beliefs they hold, where shunning involves withholding the benefits of society over those minimum benefits that are deserved merely by virtue of being a person. Through these noncoercive
modes, we may express the outrage we may feel in response to bias
crimes. Unless bias can be tied to the degree of the wrongdoing or
level of culpability, however, increased punishment is not warranted.
CONCLUSION:

THE PLACE OF

BIAS CRIME STATUTES

Bias crime statutes raise profound questions for moral and legal
theory. The acts that bias crime statutes sanction are distinguished by
the thoughts that underlie them. Having criminal sanctions triggered
by thought is a disquieting notion for a society, such as ours, committed to freedom of thought. We are thus led to investigate the ways in
which thought properly may be relevant to the criminal law. The concepts of wrongdoing and culpability inform our intuitions concerning
desert and our understanding of much of the positive criminal law.
These concepts provide a powerful analytical framework for investigating the place of bias crime statutes within a liberal political order.
161 See Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character,and Excuse, 7 Soc. PmIL & PoL'Y 29 (1990);
Murphy, supra note 118, at 297; Robinson, supra note 98, at 610 (arguing, however, that bias is
relevant to punishment).
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With respect to the wrongdoing branch of the investigation, we
may ask whether bias crime statutes are justified on the ground that
bias crimes are intrinsically or contingently more harmful than similar
nonbias crimes. In order for bias crime to be intrinsically harmful,
persons would have to have an interest in not being discriminatorily
harmed. But such an interest implies an interest in the thoughts of
another. To recognize such an interest would be incompatible with
our respect for individual autonomy, and so improper. A theory of
contingent harms is more morally palatable. Bias crimes are contingently harmful because of the secondary harms that may flow from
them. Bias crime statutes thus may be conceived as employing bias as
a proxy for the secondary harms that are their true concern. The use
of proxies, however, is only justified if it results in less overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness than using statutes drafted in terms of the
harms at issue. In the case of bias crime statutes, the uncertainties
concerning relative fit are so great that presumptions against employing proxies may be decisive.
Increased culpability is a plausible hypothesis for justifying bias
crime statutes. Mental states are traditionally considered relevant to
culpability. The mental state triggering bias crime statutes may be
construed as a type of intention, a motivation, or an intrinsic desire.
Culpability, however, is a matter of an actor's attitude toward the
morally relevant features of an act, its consequences, or its circumstances. Bias is an attitude toward a person's race, religion, or other
specified characteristic. These characteristics, however, are generally
morally irrelevant. One person has as much right to be free from assaults, harassment, and other crimes as another. Thus, acting based
on bias will not be relevant for determining culpability. We may conclude that the place of bias crime statutes is limited, existing only
where factors concerning relative fit make them the most appropriate
means of addressing secondary harms.
The contingent justification of bias crime statutes mirrors the contingent harmfulness of bias. Although they are morally mistaken
views of persons, bigotry, anti-Semitism, and other forms of bias do
not necessarily violate the interests of others. Simply because the
harmfulness of bias is contingent, however, is no reason not to condemn it, or more importantly, strive to purge our society of it. The
contingent reality of bias is all the justification that is needed to combat it without restraint through noncoercive means such as education,
protests, organizing, and personal acts against bias as it may be encountered in our daily lives. With respect to coercive means, however,
the punishments we use to combat bias must not exceed the limited
justifications that our world provides. But by whatever means we battle it, the most effective means require recognizing bias for what it is: a
source of evil consequences, rather than an instance of evil itself.
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